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INTRODUCTION

It has become increasingly common to test whether sellers in retail
markets discriminate against buyers.' But this Essay is one of the first
efforts to test the other side of the market.2 It examines whether retail
consumers discriminate against sellers on the basis of the sellers' race. Even
though Gary Becker long ago understood that consumers' "taste[] for
discrimination" could cause sellers to discriminate against other
customers3-for example, leading restaurant owners to maintain racially
segregated lunch counters-almost no one has tested whether consumers'
taste for discrimination might be directed at a seller's race itself (or the race
of a seller's employees).
This failure to test is unjustified. Tests of consumer-side race
discrimination are just as feasible as seller-side testing. Consumer price
discrimination might be observed in car and house negotiations and auction
markets (including online markets such as eBay). Of course, the ability of
consumers to discriminate in terms of pricing is often severely constrained.
Outside of auction and negotiated-pricing regimes, consumers are generally
presented with a fixed price.
But in virtually any market, there is the possibility that consumer
willingness to contract is influenced by the race of the seller or the race of

1. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE

AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001); Peter Siegelman, Race Discrimination in "Everyday"
Commercial Transactions: What Do We Know, What Do We Need To Know, and How Can We
Find Out, in A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF

TESTING 69 (Michael Fix & Margery Austin Turner eds., 1999); see also John Yinger, Evidence
on Discriminationin Consumer Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 23.
2. The only other direct test of consumer race discrimination that we were able to find was a
study of buyer behavior at baseball card trading shows when the seller's race was manipulated.
John A. List, The Nature and Extent of Discrimination in the Marketplace: Evidence
from the Field, 119 Q.J. ECON. 49, 56 (2004). Some studies have indirectly inferred the presence
of consumer discrimination. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Kahn & Peter D. Sherer, Racial Differences
in Professional Basketball Players'.Compensation, 6 J. LAB. ECON. 40, 42 (1988) ("[A]1 else
equal, white representation on a team contributes to home attendance, providing evidence
consistent with the idea of consumer discrimination."); Clark Nardinelli & Curtis Simon,
Customer Racial Discrimination in the Market for Memorabilia: The Case of Baseball, 105 Q.J.
ECON. 575, 576 (1990) ("The appeal of sports for studies of discrimination is that it is possible to
separate consumer discrimination from ability to do the work."). Employment audits are nonretail
tests of whether consumers of labor (i.e., employers) discriminate on the basis of seller race. Keith
R. Ihlanfeldt & Madelyn V. Young, Intrametropolitan Variation in Wage Rates: The Case of
Atlanta Fast-FoodRestaurant Workers, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT. 425,425 (1994) ("[E]vidence on
discrimination suggests that consumer discrimination affects the wages paid to black workers.");
see also John Yinger, Measuring Racial Discriminationwith FairHousing Audits: Caught in the
Act, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 881, 881 (1986) ("Housing agents cater to the racial prejudice of current
or potential white customers.").
3. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 57, 57-62 (1957).
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the seller's employees.4 Audit procedures could easily be designed to test
for disparate treatment by buyers with regard to refusals to deal. For
example, prospective buyers at a real estate office could be randomly
assigned to a white or minority sales agent and then tested to see whether a
white agent is more likely to make a sale then a minority agent using the
same sales pitch.
In this study, we have tested for consumer discrimination in taxicab
tipping, because it is a dimension of consumer economic behavior that is
both discretionary and potentially observable. In addition to illuminating
this important area of economic behavior, we hope this study of tipping
behavior will convince other researchers to test for consumer discrimination
in other contexts-particularly regarding willingness to contract. The
failure of civil rights advocates to undertake such studies leaves one side of
every market interaction inappropriately unexamined and unregulated.
We collected data on more than 1000 tips to taxicab drivers in New
Haven, Connecticut in 2001. After controlling for a host of other variables,
we find two potential racial effects: (1) African-American cab drivers on
average were tipped approximately one-third less than white cab drivers,
and (2) African-American and Hispanic passengers tipped approximately
one-half the amount of white passengers.
African-American passengers also seemed to participate in the racial
discrimination against African-American drivers. While African-American
passengers generally tipped less, on average they also tipped black drivers
approximately one-third less than they tipped white drivers.
The propensity to "stiff'-by which we mean to leave no tip-was
particularly racialized. African-American drivers were 80% more likely to
be stiffed than white drivers (28.3% versus 15.7%). And African-American
passengers were almost four times more likely than white passengers to
leave no tip at all (39.2% versus 10.6%).
Because we do not observe (and hence cannot accurately control for)
passenger wealth or income, it is possible that passenger poverty instead of
race may be driving this result. But cab drivers cannot directly observe
4. There have been some important sociological studies analyzing consumer preferences for
dealing with sellers of particular ethnic or racial groups. See ST. CLAIR DRAKE & HORACE R.
CAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS: A STUDY OF NEGRO LIFE IN A NORTHERN CITY (1945); Jennifer

Lee, From Civil Relations to Racial Conflict: Merchant-Customer Interactions in Urban
America, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 77 (2002); Albert E. McCormick & Graham C. Kinloch, Interracial
Contact in the Customer-Clerk Situation, 126 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 551 (1986). More recently, there
has been discussion of the rise of "for us, by us" (FUBU) consumerism, which at heart is a
movement of race-contingent consumer choice. Jerre B. Swann, Sr. et al., Trademarks and
Marketing, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 787, 802 (2001) ("FUBU ('For Us, By Us') brand clothing
became popular in the African-American community in part by tapping into the sense of cultural
unity and 'authenticity' that wearing the brand fostered."). But these studies tend to be qualitative,
failing to measure the degree of preference or to conduct statistical tests of its significance.
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passenger wealth either. They can only infer the amount of a prospective tip
based on visible characteristics, like passenger demographics, and
transactional factors, like weather, pickup location, etc. Thus, our finding
that African-American and Hispanic passengers tend to tip less can be
interpreted as an estimate of the inferences that would be made by a driver
who was a "statistical discriminator."
Our limited data allow us to estimate what kind of statistical inferences
a cab driver could make about the size of the likely tip and fare given the
observable characteristics of passengers. This Essay cashes out the
inferences that a retail seller would make about its potential customers. Our
"statistical discrimination" regressions suggest that "rational" drivers might
expect to earn a 56.5% lower tip from an African-American passenger than
from a white passenger (after controlling for a host of nonracial observable
characteristics). Overall, a driver in our data should have expected about
9% less revenue when stopping to pick up an African-American passenger
(relative to a white passenger).
This result has policy relevance because such driver inferences may
play a role in the well-documented tendency of drivers to refuse to pick up
minority passengers. 5 The data suggest that at least a portion of driver-side
discrimination may be caused neither by animus nor by (rational or
irrational) statistical inferences about crime but instead by inferences about
how much passengers of different races are likely to tip. Indeed, we show
that this revenue effect is orders of magnitude greater than any rational
inferences that might be made about the propensities of passengers of
different races to rob cab drivers.
Several caveats, however, are in order before accepting these
interpretations of the data. First, the data were based on cab drivers' reports.
Cab drivers' racial stereotypes or preconceptions may have led them to
systematically underreport black-passenger (or overreport white-passenger)
tips. Second, we do not have strong controls for driver quality. Lower tips
by African-American passengers might be explained by a general tendency
of passengers to give lower tips for poorer service, coupled with drivers
providing inferior service to African-American passengers. We respond to
these (and other) alternative hypotheses below by bringing to bear
additional pieces of evidence.
If we tentatively accept the finding of customer discrimination against
African-American drivers, it is natural to ask, "Why?" The data are not well
suited to answer this question, but they do contain some clues. For example,
the higher propensity of passengers to stiff black drivers seems more
consistent with a theory of conscious decisionmaking. Because driver
5. See infra Subsection VII.B.2.
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allocation was more or less random, this passenger discrimination cannot be
driven simply by the existence of some passengers who never tip. Rather,
there seem to be passengers who are more likely to decide not to tip
African-American drivers.
In contrast, another portion of the overall driver disparity may more
likely reflect unconscious disparate treatment. Passengers tend to round up
their tips (to the nearest dollar above their target level) more often when
tipping white drivers than when tipping black drivers (32.3% versus
24.0%).6 When confronted with a last-second decision (based on the final
fare) about whether to round up or round down, even passengers who
believe they are hardwired fifteen-percent tippers may in practice
unconsciously allow the driver's race to impact their rounding decision.7
When we decompose the overall racial disparity in tips received, we find
that racial disparities in stiffing and rounding account respectively for about
27% and 36% of the overall disparity.
The word "TIP" is thought by some to have originated in British pubs,
where signs with just these three letters were posted on boxes as a reminder
that gratuities were welcome; the letters were an acronym for the phrase
"To Insure Promptness." 8 But the evidence from this Essay is suggestive of
a new acronym: "To Insure Prejudice." Tipping may facilitate prejudice in
two different ways: (1) It allows customers to discriminate against minority
drivers, and (2) it gives cab drivers a revenue-based incentive to refuse to
pick up minority passengers.
Our two core findings give rise to a single normative implication:
Government-mandated tipping (via a "Tip Included" decal prominently
posted in cabs) might be used to reduce two different types of disparate
racial treatment. First, mandated tipping would directly reduce the
6. These percentages are taken over all fares, so that 24.0% of all black-driver fares are
rounded up to the nearest dollar above the passenger's target level.
7. This finding parallels the results for the Implicit Association Tests (IATs), which
analogously suggest that unconscious racial influences affect timed sorting decisions. See AYRES,
supra note 1, at 419 (discussing the legal relevance of IATs); Anthony G. Greenwald et al.,
Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998).

8. See E.L. KONIGSBURG, THE VIEW FROM SATURDAY 126 (1997); David Templeton, Tipper
Lore: Is It Service or Custom That Tips Scales?, SONOMA COUNTY (Cal.) INDEP., Oct. 24, 1996,
available at http://www.metroactive.com/papers/sonoma/10.24.96/dining-9643.html ("An oftrepeated story is that tipping [is] supposedly an acronym for 'to insure promptitude'...."). But
this acronym etymology is probably apocryphal:
In many foreign languages, words for "tip" are associated with drinking, because in
many countries the tip began as a gratuity to enable the tippee to buy himself a drink. In
French "pourboire" means literally "for drink;" the German "trinkgeld" is "drink
money;" the Spanish "propina" is from "propinar," meaning invite to drink; Russia's
"nachai" is the equivalent of "for tea;" and the Chinese "cumshaw" is "tea money." It
may be reasonable to surmise the word tipis a short form of"tipple"--to drink.
KERRY SEGRAVE, TIPPING: AN AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY OF GRATUITIES 5 (1998).
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passenger discrimination against black drivers documented in this study.
Second, mandated tipping might indirectly reduce the tendency of drivers to
refuse to pick up black passengers-at least to the extent that this driver
discrimination is caused by statistical inferences about differences in
tipping.
There are, however, at least two reasons to pause before eliminating
discretionary tipping. First, although research suggests that tips are not
strongly correlated with quality of service, tipping (at least in theory) may
induce better service. Second, poorer individuals, whose rides are currently
subsidized by passengers who tip more, will be less able to afford the
increased fares under a mandatory tipping regime. (To the extent that
minority individuals tend to be less wealthy, this shift would have a
disparate racial impact.)
The body of this Essay is divided into seven Parts. Part I briefly
reviews the role of race in the history of tipping in the United States. Part II
describes the data collected for this study. Part III presents the core
results-highlighting both the racial and the nonracial determinants of cab
driver tipping. Part IV presents evidence that "statistical discrimination"
may cause a portion of the well-documented reluctance of drivers to serve
African-American customers. Part V considers alternative, nonracial
hypotheses for our findings. Part VI explores what might be causing the
customer discrimination. And finally, Part VII discusses normative
implications of the findings.
I. RACE AND THE HISTORY OF TIPPING

Tipping is a substantial component of our economy. More than thirty
service professions are regularly tipped. 9 Restaurant, bar, and lodging tips
in the United States have been estimated at twenty-six billion dollars a
year. 0 The tipping norm is now broadly accepted both as a matter of
equity-to increase the wages of workers in the service industry-and as a
matter of efficiency-to increase the quality of service." People tend not to
9. Michael Lynn et al., Consumer Tipping: A Cross-Country Study, 20 J. CONSUMER RES.
478, 482 (1993) (citing NANCY STAR, THE INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO TIPPING (1988)).
10. Ofer H. Azar, The Social Norm of Tipping: A Review I (Sept. 5, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-370081.
11. See Uri Ben-Zion & Edi Kami, "Tip " Payments and the Quality of Service, in ESSAYS IN
LABOR MARKET ANALYSIS 37 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1977) (explicitly
modeling a repeated interaction between a customer who chooses how much to tip and a service
agent who chooses how much effort to provide to show how a marginal reward for effort could
induce the service agent to provide more than the minimal effort level). Researchers have
explored a variety of server strategies that can enhance restaurant tipping:
In one well-known 1984 experiment, researchers found that a waitress who
touched her customers, whether male or female, on the hand or shoulder when asking if
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know what percentage of income their parents give to charity, but they
know their parents' tipping percentage. 12 Indeed, parents often
explicitly
3
tell their children how much they should tip in various settings.
But what is less well known is that the social practice of tipping was
much more controversial 100 years ago. Critics referred to the practice as
"un-American" and incompatible with democracy. 14 Former Yale law
professor William Howard Taft was the "patron saint of the anti-tip
crusade,"' 15 and Ralph Waldo Emerson roundly condemned the practice: "I
sometimes succumb and give the dollar, yet it is a wicked dollar which by
16 Tipping was attacked as
and by I shall have the manhood to withhold."
' 17
bribery and as "training school of graft."
In the early twentieth century, seven states passed anti-tipping statutes
that to varying degrees outlawed the practice. 18 Today many patrons and
workers in the service industry look on the tipping practice not only as
nonstigmatizing but, indeed, as a worker's entitlement for work well done.
At the turn of the last century, in contrast, tipping was often viewed as a
marker of degradation. Both the giving and the receiving of tips were
perceived as an acceptance of the recipient's inferiority. 19 In The Itching
the meal was all right, raised her tips to 14 percent, from 11 percent .... [Tips are also
increased by] crouching at the table when taking an order instead of standing upright
or, if the server is a woman, putting a smiley face on the bill. For male waiters, the
smiley face actually cuts tips.
William Grimes, Tips: Check Your Insecurity at the Door,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1999, at F 1.
12. BARRY NALEBUFF & IAN AYRES, WHY NOT?: How To USE EVERYDAY INGENUITY TO
SOLVE PROBLEMS BIG AND SMALL 101 (2003).
13. Id. at 101.
14. SEGRAVE, supra note 8, at 5-6 ("What, may I ask, is more un-American than tipping? It
doesn't belong in American society; it doesn't belong in a democracy. It is a product of lands
where for centuries there has been a servile class." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
WILLIAM R. SCOTT, THE ITCHING PALM: A STUDY OF THE HABIT OF TIPPING IN AMERICA 38
(1916) ("In the American democracy to be servile is incompatible with citizenship. Every tip
given in the United States is a blow at our experiment in democracy.").
15. Taft an Anti-Tipper, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1908, at 2 ("'[N]ever a tip did he give. I
understand that he thinks he has paid for the work when he gives the regular price, and I guess he
is right."' (quoting Taft's barber)).
16. The Point of View: Regulating Tips, SCRIBNER'S MAG., Feb. 1909, at 250, 252 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
17. SCOTT, supra note 14, at 42. In 1920, William Rufus Scott launched the Commercial
Bribery and Tipping Review. SEGRAVE, supra note 8, at 72. Scott argued that tipping was not only
a form of bribery whereby one customer sought unfair advantage over another but also a breeding
ground for social corruption more generally. He wondered, "Will a messenger boy who thinks that
the public owes him gratuities develop into a man with sound morals?" SCOTT, supra note 14, at
42. "There is a direct connection between corruption in elections and the custom of tipping. The
man who lives upon tips will not see the dishonesty of selling his vote .... Id. at 43.
18. Stephanie Cook, A History of 'Handing it Over,' CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 23,
2000, at 14; see also SEGRAVE, supra note 8, at 29.
19. The predecessor to The Oxford English Dictionary in 1916 defined "tip" as "[a] small
present of money given to an inferior." [Ti-Tz] A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL
PRINCIPLES; FOUNDED MAINLY ON THE MATERIALS COLLECTED BY THE PHILOLOGICAL
SOCIETY 60 (James A.H. Murray ed., 1888, 1916). "[T]ipping makes the daily income of the

Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal

To Insure Prejudice

20051

1621

Palm, a 1916 manifesto against the practice, William Rufus Scott said that
tipping is a form of "Flunkyism" defined as "a willingness to be servile for
a consideration. 2 °
This degradation conception of tipping was intimately tied to race.
Kerry Segrave has taken the lead in excavating this history:
[A] Gunton's Magazine article in 1896... remarked that in the
United States "we have been comparatively free from this offensive
semi-mendicancy." However, tipping was a growing custom among
a certain class of laborers such as domestic servants, coachmen,
barbers, waiters, and railroad porters: "It will be observed that these
occupations are nearly all filled by foreigners and negroes who for
the most part have been reared under the patronizing and semifeudal influences of paternal or ante-wage condition[s]." Centuries
of slavery had left blacks in menial jobs while Europeans were
menial workers due to the "aristocratic, patronizing conditions of
Europe. 21
For some, the practice of tipping was intimately connected to the
perceived inferiority of African Americans. In 1902, for example, a
Southern journalist named John Speed remarked,
I had never known any but negro servants. Negroes take tips, of
course; one expects that of them-it is a token of their inferiority.
But to give money to a white man was embarrassing to me. I felt
defiled by his debasement and servility. Indeed, I do not now
comprehend how any native-born American could consent to take a
tip. Tips go with servility, and no man who is a voter in this country
by birthright is in the least justified in being servile.22
Scott also condemned tipping as a form of servility and compared it to
slavery in the United States: "The relation of a man giving a tip and a man
accepting it is as undemocratic as the relation of master and slave. '23
The modem tipping norm was incubated in a history rife with explicit
racism-as can be seen in the public prominence given to a seemingly
insignificant vignette reported by Segrave. In 1907, a South Carolina
worker dependent upon his subservience to the passing humor of the customer. It promotes
fawning and sycophancy, and kills dignity and independence." SEGRAVE, supra note 8, at 72

(internal quotation marks omitted).
20. ScOTT, supra note 14, at 7.
21. SEGRAVE, supra note 8, at 6 (quoting Economic Effects of Tipping, 11 GUNTON'S MAG.
13, 14-15 (1896)).
22. John Gilmer Speed, Tips and Commissions, 69 LIPPNCOTr'S MONTHLY MAG. 742, 748
(1902).
23. ScOTT, supra note 14, at 50.
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senator, well known for his claim never to "tip[] a nigger," tipped a black
porter in a Nebraska hotel.2 4 The porter "joked that he would have the
quarter made into a watch charm., 25 A New York Times editor defended the
senator's no-tipping policy as "not meanness," but rather "a matter of
principle. 2 6
The practice of tipping-far from being perceived as a way of
increasing the pay of service workers-was frequently seen as an employer
strategy for exploiting workers, particularly black workers. The Pullman
Company in particular was repeatedly singled out for fostering the tipping
norm for its all-black workforce as a way of economizing on its wage bill.
In 1914, when the Railroad Commission of California asked why the
company only hired blacks from the South, an executive explained, "[T]he
Southern negro is more pleasing to the traveling public. He is more adapted
to wait on people and serve with a smile., 27 The St. Louis Republic
newspaper concluded that "[i]t was the Pullman company which fastened
the tipping habit on the American people and they used the negro as the
instrument to do it with., 28 Pullman made public the fact that its AfricanAmerican porters were poorly paid so that the public would pay them
instead.
When the Pullman porters organized into the Brotherhood of Sleeping
Car Porters in 1925, one of the first things they did was to petition the
Interstate Commerce Commission for an order prohibiting tips. The New
York Times account of the petition noted, "Only Negroes, many of them exslaves, were employed as porters. This, says the petition, caused the work to
be looked on as 'menial and servile' and led to the giving and taking of
gratuities., 29 That porters would ask the ICC to prohibit a form of their
compensation is remarkable. True, a tipping prohibition would put pressure
on the Pullman Company to pay higher wages. But it is hard to imagine that
the increase in wages would more than offset the loss of tipping income.3 °
The petition may therefore have had a noneconomic motive. Even if the
prohibition would not increase their net incomes, the black porters' union
might have wanted it nonetheless-possibly to increase the dignitary
dimensions of their employment. They too may have seen the receiving of

24. SEGRAVE, supranote 8, at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. SCOTr, supra note 14, at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Id. at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. PortersAssail Tipping, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1927, at 23 (quoting the petition).
30. One possibility is that making transparent the low net income of the porters would have
induced the government to require an increase in their pay.
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tips as "a token of their inferiority" and wanted to move away from an
equilibrium of having to scrape and bow for their living.3 1
This brief detour does not begin to serve as a full history of tipping
practices or their intersections with race. 32 But it may somewhat destabilize
and problematize current norms about the inherent desert of service workers
to tips. We will pick up this history again both when we discuss the
tendency of minority passengers to tip less than whites and when we
discuss our proposal to discourage discretionary tipping.

II. DESCRIPTION OF DATA
In April and May 2001, we collected tipping data from 1066 surveys
completed by twelve different New Haven medallion taxicab drivers (six
black men, four white men, and two "other minority ' 33 men). As of the
2000 Census, the City of New Haven had a total population of 123,626.
Hispanics comprised 21.4% of the city's population. Of those residents,
both Hispanic and non-Hispanic, reporting only one race (96.1% of the
total), 37.4% were African American and 43.5% were white.34 As with
many cities, the surrounding suburbs are generally whiter and wealthier.
New Haven County had a total population of 824,008 in 2000. Hispanics
made up 10.1% of the county as a whole; blacks, 11.3%; and whites,
79.4%.35 The median household income in 1999 was $29,604 in the city
36
versus $48,834 in the county.

31. We find no explicit historical treatment of the way in which the contemporary view of
tipping as signaling a server's worth came to dominate the earlier degradation conception.
Nevertheless, Segrave's history suggests an intermediate state-that by the 1950s tipping was

regarded more as nuisance than as moral dilemma.
32. There has been very little historical study of the racial dimension of tipping, particularly
beyond the early part of the twentieth century when tipping was explicitly linked to slavery. Much
more research is necessary to draw out the full implications of this history.
33. In this "other minority" racial category, one of the cab drivers self-reported his race as
being "Arab (Franco-Moroccan)" and the other "Asian (Indian)." The racial composition of New
Haven cab drivers (who are predominantly white or black) differs markedly from other cities'.
See, e.g., Katherine Zoepf, In Chelsea,a Little Dal Spells Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, § 14,

at 4 ("A spokesman for the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission estimates that
70 percent of the city's 100,000 cabbies are from the Indian subcontinent.").
34. Census
Bureau, American
FactFinder,
http://factfmder.census.gov/home/saff/
main.html?_lang-en (search "Get a Fact Sheet for your community" for "New Haven,
Connecticut" and follow "New Haven city, Connecticut" link) (last visited Apr. 30, 2005).
35. Id.

36. Compare id. with Census Bureau, American FactFinder, http://factfinder.census.gov/
home/saff/main.html? lang--en (search "Get a Fact Sheet for your community" for "New Haven,
Connecticut" and follow "New Haven County, Connecticut" link) (last visited Apr. 30, 2005).
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As do other localities, 37 New Haven regulates both the number of taxis
on the road and the price taxis can charge. Taxis are common carriers that
have a duty to "service all" customers. 38 There are about 140 medallions in
New Haven, predominantly owned by the MetroCab Company. With only a
few exceptions, the cabs in our study were leased from MetroCab on a
fixed-cost basis-meaning that the drivers were the residual claimants of all
revenues, including tips.
The drivers were instructed to complete the surveys immediately after
dropping off their passengers and were subsequently paid (by us) one dollar
per survey. The amount tipped was calculated as the difference between the
amount due (the fare) and the total amount paid by the passenger to the
driver. Drivers reported information on passenger and driver profiles,
including sex, race, age, passenger dress (as a proxy for wealth), and driver
experience. Drivers were also asked to indicate if they knew the passengers,
if the passengers were regular clients, if conversation took place between
them, if the pickup was in response to a call, and if the passenger paid cash.
Other data included pickup and drop-off neighborhoods, travel times, day
of the week, time of day, temperature, and weather.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for this survey data set.

37. See Lee A. Harris, Taxicab Economics: The Freedom To Contractfor a Ride, 1 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 195, 200 (2002). Harris notes that the main constraints in the taxicab industry can
be schematized, loosely, into two categories-entry controls and price restrictions. Id. at 201. The
artificial restriction of supply has caused New York medallions to be worth well in excess of
$150,000. Marcus Cole has suggested that the medallion system reduces competition and allows
drivers more leeway in refusing to pick up minority passengers. Marcus Cole, Medallion
Monopoly Drives Taxicab Racism, LIBERTY & L. (Inst. for Justice, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2000,
at 4.
38. In many jurisdictions, the "service all" rule is enforced by prohibiting taxicab drivers
from asking the destination of passengers until they have entered the vehicle. Harris, supra note
37, at 209. In New Haven, dispatchers inquire about destination but do not pass that information
along to drivers. Some drivers, however, circumvent the dispatchers by distributing personal
business cards with cell phone numbers. During our testing process, one such driver declined to
pick up a tester after inquiring as to drop-off location.

Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal

2005]

1625

To Insure Prejudice

TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS

Observations

Mean

Standard
deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Tip ($)

1059

1.22

2.25

-5

27.5

Tip as %of fare

1059

0.16

0.27

-0.14

5.22

Stiffing rate

1059

0.24

0.43

0

1

Travel time (minutes)

952

9.94

11.89

1.5

200

Travel distance (miles)

943

4.59

7.73

0.2

90

Amount due (S)

1064

9.26

11.51

2.5

150

Amount paid ($)

Continuous variables

1059

10.48

12.86

3

170

0

1044

52.25

10.38

28

80

39

1039

32.77

13.45

5

85

Driver age

1016

39.78

7.95

24

51

Driver experience
(weeks)

1066

62.69

53.47

2

192

Temperature ( F)
Passenger age

I
4

Observations

Percentage '

Mean tip

Mean tip

Female

506

47.5%

0.97

15.5%

Male

443

41.6%

1.46

16.6%

41

3.9%

0.79

12.8%

Average

858

80.5%

1.16

15.1%

Above average

146

13.7%

1.74

21.8%

Respond to call

648

68.9%

1.24

15.9%

Luggage

196

18.4%

1.61

15.3%

4

Indicator variables )
Passenger sex:

Passenger dress:
Below average

39. For multiple-passenger rides, drivers were instructed to record information only for the
passenger who paid the fare.
40. Among those variables not listed here are indicators for neighborhood and address, day of
the week, time of day, fare type (on the dollar; $0.25, $0.50, and $0.75 above the dollar),
individual driver, and categorical variables derived from continuous variables.
41. Variable percentages may not add up to 100 if the variable is undefined for any
observations.
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Regular customer

188

17.6%

1.87

25.0%

Acquaintance,

254

23.8%

1.85

24.6%

Conversation

720

67.5%

1.37

17.3%

Rain or snow

27

2.5%

2.28

37.8%

Cash

935

98.1%

1.21

16.5%

Overall, the average tip was $1.22, and the average tip as a percentage
of fare was 15.8%.42 The percentage of passengers who left no tip (the
"stiffing rate") was 23.8%. 43 The data contain substantial numbers of both
male and female passengers and are also. well balanced with regard to
44
black- and white-driver observations (n = 517 and 450, respectively),
which aids greatly in developing statistically reliable tests of whether
consumers discriminate in tipping.
Unlike New York or Washington cab drivers, who obtain a substantial
portion of their fares from passengers who hail them from the street, New
Haven cab drivers predominantly obtain fares by responding to radio calls
or by waiting at designated stands (for example, at the New Haven train
station or airport). More than two-thirds of our observations came from
responses to a dispatcher's call, and the remainder came mostly from
drivers waiting their turn at cab stands. Because both the dispatcher and the
cab stand pickups are distributed on a queued basis and because New
Haven drivers do not have as much discretion in turning down fares as
hailed cab drivers, the structure of service provision tends to randomize
driver-customer pairings. The tendency toward randomization increases the
power of our test of consumer discrimination.
III. RESULTS
While we ultimately rely on multivariate regression analysis, our
central results are suggested by simply calculating the race-specific means
for the tip amount.

42. Here and throughout this Essay, the average dollar and percentage tip figures reflect the
full data set, including zero- and negative-tip observations.
43. There were only seven negative tips in our data. We retained them as examples of
instances where the passenger may not have had sufficient funds to pay the entire fare. None of
the core results change if these observations are omitted.
44. This did not occur by chance-drivers were recruited with the goal of achieving balance
between black and white drivers. Accordingly, the data are not necessarily representative of the
racial mix of cab drivers in New Haven.
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A. Lower Tips for Minority Drivers
The central evidence of consumer discrimination is summarized in
Table 2.
TABLE 2. AVERAGE TIPS AND TIP PERCENTAGE BY DRIVER RACE
45
Race disparity ratios
Tip
Tip percentage

Mean lip

Mean tip
percentage

White

$1.54

20.3%

Black

$1.02

12.6%

0.66

0.62

Other

$0.76

12.4%

0.50

0.61

Driver race

-

-

White drivers are tipped substantially more than black (or other) drivers
whether measured either in terms of the average tip amount or the average
tip percentage. White drivers were tipped 61% more than black drivers
(20.3% versus 12.6%) and 64% more than our "other minority" drivers
(20.3% versus 12.4%). Put simply, passengers systematically tipped white
drivers substantially more than nonwhite drivers.
Disparate treatment in tipping can also be seen in passengers' disparate
propensities to stiff drivers of different races.
TABLE 3. STIFFING RATE BY DRIVER RACE

Driver race

Stiffing rate

Race disparity ratios

White

15.7%

-

Black

28.3%

1.80

Other

36.4%

2.31

Table 3 shows that the rate at which white drivers were stiffed (15.7%) was
far less than that of nonwhite drivers (28.3% and 36.4% for black and
"other minority" drivers, respectively). Black drivers were 80% more likely
to be stiffed than white drivers (and our "other minority" drivers were
131% more likely).

45. Disparity here and in all subsequent tables is defined as the given statistic divided by the
White statistic.
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B. Lower Tips by Minority Passengers
The second racial effect that can be seen inthe aggregate data concerns
the propensity of different racial groups to tip different amounts.
TABLE 4. AVERAGE TIPS AND TIPPING PERCENTAGE BY PASSENGER RACE

PassengeIr race

S

Men tp

Mean tip

Mean tip

Race disparity ratios

percentageTip

Tip percentage

White

$1.82

21.6%

Black

$0.60

9.2%

0.33

0.42

Hispanic

$0.81

12.0%

0.44

0.55

Asian

$1.02

16.2%

0.56

0.75

Other

$0.84

10.7%

0.46

0.49

Table 4, for example, shows that the average tipping percentage of black
passengers in our data was only 42% of the average tipping percentage of
white passengers (9.2% versus 21.6%). The tipping percentage of Hispanic
passengers was only slightly more than half of the white-passenger tipping
percentage (12.0% versus 21.6%). And Asian passengers tipped only 75%
of the white-passenger tipping percentage (16.2% versus 21.6%).
As before, the racial disparity in the average tip amount or tip
percentage can also be seen in the different propensities of passengers to
stiff drivers.
TABLE 5. STIFFING RATE BY PASSENGER RACE

Passenger race

Stiffing rate

Race disparity ratios

White

10.6%

Black

39.2%

3.69

Hispanic

34.3%

3.23

Asian

15.8%

1.49

Other

35.7%

3.36

Table 5 shows that black passengers in our data were 3.7 times more likely
to stiff than white passengers, and Hispanic passengers were 3.2 times more
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likely (39.2% and 34.3% stiffing rates for blacks and Hispanics respectively
versus only 10.6% for whites).
It is important to emphasize, however, that the racial disparities
reported in Tables 4 and 5 (as well as those uncovered in Tables 2 and 3)
are just first cuts at the data. These tables do not control for other
variables-such as the socioeconomic status of the passenger or the service
quality of the driver-that might be driving the result. These issues and
others will be explicitly discussed in considering alternative hypotheses in
Part IV.
But, as emphasized in the Introduction, these passenger-race results
may have policy relevance even without controlling for any nonracial
factors. A driver who "irrationally" makes inferences based solely on a
passenger's race would be apt to infer that black or Hispanic passengers tip
only half as much as whites-and this inference might lead the driver to
discriminate against these passengers. We will return to this issue more
formally in Part VI.
C. DriverandPassengerRacialIntersections
A natural question to ask is whether minority passengers tip black
drivers less than white drivers. Table 6 suggests that they do.
Indeed, Table 6 shows that, measured on a percentage basis, the driverrace disparity was nearly identical for black and white passengers. White
passengers tipped white drivers 67% more than black drivers (26.7% versus
17.9%), while black passengers tipped white drivers 67% more than black
drivers (11.0% versus 7.4%). To be clear, black passengers generally tipped
less than white passengers, but black passengers tipped black drivers even
less. Thus, at least with regard to the two largest racial groups in our
sample, 46 there seem to be largely independent passenger- and driver-race
effects.

46. Observations from Hispanic passengers produced the largest driver disparity-with the
tipping percentage for white drivers being 146% higher than the tipping percentage for black
drivers (17.5% versus 7.1%). Asian passengers were the only group to tip black drivers a higher
percentage than white drivers (18.1% and 16.1% for black and white drivers, respectively).
47. Analogous numbers concerning the average amount tipped can be found at
http://www.yalelawjournal.org. The results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 6: Again,
black and Hispanic passengers, like whites, tipped black cab drivers less.
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TABLE 6. AVERAGE TIPPING PERCENTAGE
BY PASSENGER AND DRIVER RACE

White

26.7%

Black

17.9%

222

0.67

Other

13.2%

34

0.49

White

11.0%

112

-

Black

7.4%

176

0.67

Other

13.1%

28

1.19

White

17.50%

57

-

Black

7.1%

63

0.41

Other

11.3%

17

0.65

White

16.1%

42

-

Black

18.1%

36

1.12

Other

12.3%

17

0.77

White

14.8%

6

-

Black

11.0%

5

0.74

Other

1.8%

3

0.12

1

The tendency of minority passengers to join in the larger pattern of
passenger discrimination against minority drivers can also be seen in an
analysis of stiffing rates.
Table 7 shows that white passengers are almost twice as likely to stiff
black drivers as white drivers (12.2% versus 6.3%). Again, the behavior of
minority passengers qualitatively mirrors this disparity. From Table 5, we
already know that black passengers are more likely to stiff drivers than
white passengers, but Table 7 shows that black passengers are almost a
third more likely to stiff black drivers than white drivers (43.2% versus
33.0%) and that Hispanic passengers are 88% more likely to stiff black
drivers than white drivers (42.9% versus 22.8%).
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TABLE

Passenger race

White

Black

Hispanic

Asian

Other

7. STIFFING RATE BY PASSENGER AND DRIVER RACE
Race disparity ratios

Driver race

Stiffing rate

Observations

White

6.3%

224

-

Black

12.2%

222

1.95

Other

29.4%

34

4.71

White

33.0%

112

-

Black

43.2%

176

1.31

Other

39.3%

28

1.19

White

22.8%

57

-

Black

42.9%

63

1.88

Other

41.2%

17

1.81

White

9.5%

42

-

Black

13.9%

36

1.46

Other

35.3%

17

3.71

White

33.3%

6

Black

20.0%

5

0.60

Other

66.7%

3

2.00

-

D. Regression Analysis
The disparities reported in the previous tables, however, are provided
only for heuristic purposes. Without more, we cannot know whether the
results will be robust until we control for a host of nonracial factors that
might influence the amount that passengers tip. The results of multivariate
regression analysis are presented in the Appendix. This Section summarizes
the most important results.
After controlling for random driver effects and a host of time, manner,
and place effects, our various models suggest that the customer
discrimination result is quite robust. Adding additional variables to the
regression does not materially impact the size or statistical significance of
the driver-race variables. For the most complete regression, we find that
black drivers are tipped 9.1 percentage points less than white drivers (and
that this result is statistically significant at the 1% level).
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The finding that minorities tip systematically less, in contrast, is not as
robust to the inclusion of additional right-hand-side control variables. The
size of the coefficients becomes smaller as additional controls are added.
For the most complete regression, the size of the black-passenger effect is
diminished to 9 percentage points (from 11.7 percentage points in the least
complete regression model).4 8
While 9 percentage points is still substantial, the larger point here is
that even our most complete specification contains only poor controls for
the socioeconomic class of the passenger (above- or below-average dress
and characteristics of pickup and drop-off locations). With better controls,
the seeming tendency of minorities to tip less might simply become a
tendency of poorer people to tip less.
IV. TESTS OF DRIVER "STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION" INFERENCES

Our finding that minority passengers tend to tip a lower percentage and
stiff more frequently was confirmed as statistically significant for blacks in
all specifications. But the absolute size of this effect was not as robust to
the inclusion of additional right-hand-side controls. As additional controls
are added, the size of the black-passenger coefficients in Tables 13 and 15
becomes smaller. Because we do not observe passenger wealth or income,
it is possible that passenger poverty (or other omitted variables such as
driver service) instead of race may really be driving this minority-passenger
result.
But our limited data allow us to estimate what kind of statistical
inferences a cab driver would make about the size of the likely tip and fare
given the observable characteristics of the passengers. Estimating the
inferences that a driver with limited information would make about the
expected tipping of different racial groups is normatively relevant, because
such inferences might cause drivers to refuse to pick up passengers who are
perceived to be low tippers. Indeed, the next two Sections lay out evidence
that (1) driver discrimination against African Americans is a serious
problem and (2) at least part of these driver refusals are actuated by just this
type of "statistical discrimination."
A. Evidence of DriverDiscrimination
There is abundant empirical evidence that cab drivers have
discriminated against African-American passengers by refusing to pick

48. The stiffing results generally follow the same pattern.
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them up. 49 A 1989 audit study sponsored by the Washington Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights provides controlled evidence of disparate racial
treatment by cab drivers. One black and one white tester stood three car
lengths from each other and attempted to hail a cab in Washington, D.C.
The study found that taxis were 11.2% more likely to stop for whites than
blacks and 50
that as a result blacks had to wait, on average, 27% longer for a
stop.
to
cab
Evidence of this "drive-by racism" can also be gleaned from broader
surveys of the population. For example, an ABC News poll found that a
plurality of blacks (42%) believe that taxi drivers avoid picking up blacks
(only 19% of whites agree); one in six blacks (18%) report that they have
personally been refused a cab ride. 5'
Anecdotal evidence is in accord. Dozens of prominent African
Americans have presented detailed descriptions of discrimination. For
example, an incident in 1993 in which Cornel West was refused service by
ten taxis in a row provoked him to write Race Matters.5 2 More recently,
actor Danny Glover filed a complaint with the New York Taxi and
Limousine Commission (TLC) after five cab drivers refused to pick up him
and his daughter.5 3 Following newspaper reports of the Glover incident,
several other prominent African-American men-including Harry
Belafonte, David Dinkins, and Denzel Washington--came forward to
report that cab drivers had refused to pick them up as well.54 The TLC at
49. See Cole, supra note 37. This discrimination seems particularly pronounced in cities like
New York and Washington where flagging down cabs is more prevalent. In the past-and
possibly as a response to driver discrimination-informal "jitney" cabs would serve AfricanAmerican neighborhoods. See Mamie Ward, A Long Cab Ride Ending, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 4,
2005, at IA, available at http://www.miami.comlmld/miamiherald/2005/O1/04/news/locaU
10559093.htm?lc; see also RUBEN SANTIAGO-HUDSON, LACKAWANNA BLUES (2001); AUGUST
WILSON, JITNEY (2000). Jitneys are essentially illegal in the United States. There are, however,
cities where jitney service continues, including New York and Miami. One attraction ofjitneys is
that the "drivers frequently live in their [passengers'] neighborhoods and are thus attuned to the
unique needs of their communities." Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Roadfrom Welfare to Work:
Informal Transportationand the Urban Poor, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173, 207-08 (2001). In this

respect, jitneys may represent another manifestation of the FUBU movement.
50. Siegelman, supra note 1,at 76-77.
51. Press Release, ABC News, Perception vs Experience in Racial Discrimination 1 (Feb. 1,
2000), availableat http://abcnews.go.com/images/pdf/8 1ORace.pdf.
52. CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS, at x (1993).
53. Monte Williams, Danny Glover Says Cabbies DiscriminatedAgainst Him, N.Y. TIMES,

Nov. 4, 1999, at B8.
54. J.M. Shenoy, African Americans Flag Down NY Cabbies, REDIFF ON THE NET, Nov. 6,
1999, http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/nov/06us1.htn.
Several African American celebrities and senior executives working for top law
and financial firms in New York were all over the media in the past 24 hours detailing
their own experiences.
Makeup artist Dynode Marcie said he was in a tuxedo and waiting for a cab near
the Radio City Hall in Manhattan after the Grammy Awards were given out.
Several cabbies passed by him....
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the time was averaging seven complaints of driver discrimination each
55
day.
In response to the Glover incident, New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani
started "Operation Refusal"--a sting operation in which 150 undercover
police were empowered to immediately impound the cabs of drivers who
refused to pick up minority passengers. 56 First-time offenders were fined up
to $350; third offenders could have their licenses permanently revoked.57
B. Tests of StatisticalDiscrimination
All in all, there seems to be overwhelming evidence of pickup
discrimination by drivers against minority passengers. Indeed, while there
has been a sustained debate about cab driver discrimination, the debate does
not concern whether such discrimination exists but whether it is justified.
To date, the defenders of the discrimination (including many cab
drivers themselves) have argued that driver discrimination is a reasonable
reaction to a heightened risk that minority passengers will hurt them during
the commission of a robbery. For example, in a column entitled Is It
Racism, or Is It Fear?,Boston Globe columnist Jeff Jacoby noted a Bureau
of Labor Statistics report that cab drivers and chauffeurs "accounted for
almost one-Oth of all victims of job-related homicide but less than one-half
of 1 percent of the nation's work force," and argued that "[f]or most
[drivers], racism isn't a reason to avoid
picking up black men or driving to
58
black neighborhoods. Prudence is."
Drivers emphasize that they are often not scared of minority passengers
themselves but of where the passengers will ask them to go. One driver
explained, "The man who gets into my cab could be the best man in the
world but who knows what could happen to me after I have dropped him
home? ' 59 By this argument, it might be rational for cab drivers to refuse to

A top Wall Street executive said that on a cold night, four cabs passed by her and
her three children. When a white man appeared a few minutes later and stood a few feet
ahead of her, two cabbies almost ran into each other trying to stop for him.
Id.; see also Dan Ackman, City Denies Due Process to Cabbies, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 21,
2000, at A51.
55. My 'Zero-Tolerance' Plan To End Taxi Discrimination, FIELDSNOTES (Manhattan
Borough President C. Virginia Fields, New York, N.Y.), Winter 2000, at 3, available at
http://www.cvfieldsmbp.org/newsIetter/fieldsnotes7.pdf.
56. See, e.g., Padberg v. McGrath-McKechnie, 108 F. Supp. 2d 177, 179-81 (E.D.N.Y.
2000); Randy Kennedy, Cabbies Entitled to Hearings,Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2002, at
B4.
57. Jeff Jacoby, Op-Ed, Is It Racism, or Is It Fear?,BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 18, 1999, at A27.
58. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also DINESH D'SouZA, THE END OF RACISM:
PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY 282 (1995).
59. Shenoy, supra note 54 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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pick up even well-dressed, elderly African-American women (who present
a very low probability of committing crime themselves) if they are more
likely than others to live in high-crime neighborhoods.
Of course, opponents of driver discrimination have appropriately
questioned whether such discrimination might instead be driven by
irrational statistical inferences, stereotypes, or more traditional forms of
racial animus.6 ° But this Essay suggests the possibility of another dimension
of statistical discrimination. Instead of (or in addition to) making inferences
about crime, cab drivers might refuse to pick up minority passengers
because they expect a lower tip, a lower fare, or a higher chance of having
to "deadhead" back from the drop-off location without a return fare.
The idea that servers might give poorer service or refuse to serve a
demographic group that they predict will give a poor tip is not new. For
example, the Railroad Commission of California concluded in 1914 that
"women traveling alone, because they are known to tip less 'generously'
than men, receive the aid of the porters last or not at all.'
More recently, Michael Lynn, the leading empiricist on tipping in the
United States, has argued that the tendency of African Americans to tip less
has created a problem for the restaurant industry: "Many waiters and
waitresses believe that African-Americans tip less than Caucasians.... As
a result of that belief, many table servers dislike waiting on black
customers, deliver inferior service to black guests on whom they must wait,
and refuse to work in restaurants with a predominantly black clientele. 6 2
Lynn supports these claims with a variety of anecdotes from industry
participants describing higher rates of server turnover for restaurants
located in minority neighborhoods unless the restaurant pays a higher wage

60. See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians,
and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994). Armour has also argued that racial
inferences are irrational in a more dynamic sense. A prospective decisionmaker could more
accurately assess the qualities of, say, an employment candidate by fairly straightforward
investigation and examination. JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE
RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 51-52, 57-58 (1997) (discussing
dynamic efficiency issues and the application of statistical inference by cab drivers). Race would
often not be the best evidence of merit if the employer were doing her due diligence. But this
dynamic critique of statistical discrimination has less force in thinking about whether cab drivers'
refusal to serve is rational. A hypothetical driver approaching the curb to pick up a potential
passenger has very little opportunity to acquire additional information about the passenger's
qualities. The only information that the driver can access are the things that are visible from inside
the cab-and it is just these variables that we collected in our surveys.
61. Tips Really Don't Go to Tiptakers, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1914, at 10. Similarly, a New
Jersey restaurant owner pushed legislation outlawing tipping because he felt that "poor persons
are at times insulted because of their small gratuities." Law To Cut Down Tips, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 1911, at 1.

62. MICHAEL LYNN, ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN TIPPING: A MATTER OF FAMILIARITY 2 (Ctr.
for Hospitality Research at Cornell Univ., Working Paper Series, No. 03-21-03, 2003).
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or mandates a minimum tip.63 Similarly, he quotes one commentator as
suggesting, "Across America, there is a widespread belief among
restaurateurs that African-Americans and members of some immigrant
ethnic groups just aren't good tippers. This perception, they say, shapes
strategic decisions about restaurant placement and customer policies, yet it
is rarely discussed publicly because bringing it up might appear racist., 64 In
short, statistical inference may not just cause servers to discriminate, it may
also have substantial repercussions on industrywide behavior.
While such statistical discrimination might be theoretically coherent,
actual inferences made on this basis may be irrational or stereotyped.
Indeed, psychologists have found that people who believe they are merely
rational statistical race discriminators are more likely than others to harbor
unconscious biases against minorities.6 5 To see whether tipping or one of
the other revenue-based inferences might plausibly induce driver
discrimination, it is helpful to assess the magnitude of the inference that
rational drivers would make.
Fortunately, the data are fairly well suited for this task. While our data
omit many nonracial factors that might better explain why some people
leave low tips, they do contain a rich set of variables describing the
information available to the cab driver. Accordingly, it was possible for us
to run "observational" regressions controlling for the factors that a driver
could observe about a passenger when pulling up to the curb.66
These regressions allow us to directly assess what kind of inferences
drivers would make about different passenger races after controlling for
other information observable at curbside. This turns a computational vice
into a virtue. For these purposes, we need not be embarrassed by the
omitted-variable problems that would hinder any attempt to test whether a
passenger's race actually causes the passenger to tip more or less. Instead,
we are interested in what kinds of inferences a driver would make given his
or her limited information.
Because the salience of race may swamp the informational content of
other variables, we ran the observational or statistical discrimination
regressions two different ways. First, we estimated the racial inferences that
63. See, e.g., id. at 8 ("Sid Levy, who operates steakhouses in black communities in
Maryland, has said that his servers make less in tips than do servers at other restaurants in the
region. As a result, he experiences higher-than-typical turnover and is experimenting with
additional ways of compensating his servers . .. Gerald Young, who owns an independent

restaurant in Philadelphia, has said that low tips from non-white customers resulted in monthly
turnover of 100 percent until he decided to add an automatic, 18-percent gratuity to every bill.").

64. Id.at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. William A. Cunningham et al., Implicit and Explicit Ethnocentrism: Revisiting the
Ideologies ofPrejudice,30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1332 (2004).

66. In these regressions, we ignored information (such as drop-off location, conversation, and
distance) that only became knowable during or after the fare.
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an "irrational" statistical discriminator would make if he saw only
passenger race (and ignored all nonracial factors). Second, we estimated the
racial inferences that a "rational" discriminator would make after taking
into account our full panoply of curbside-observable information. To our
knowledge, this is the first time that anyone has quantitatively measured the
inferences that a statistical discriminator might make.
TABLE

8.

ESTIMATING ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES (RELATIVE TO

WHITE PASSENGERS) DRIVERS COULD EXPECT BY OBSERVING
THE MINORITY STATUS OF CUSTOMERS

Pa

r

Observation

ispnic iii

-1.093

-0.953

0.466

0.255

-0.486

-0.711

0.594

0.228

0.002

-0.512

-0.436

0.460

0.087

-0.017

-1.300

-0.864

0.399

0.205

-

968

963

-

958

436

0.1665

0.2281

-

0.2328

0.2116

-0.049

Note: Underlined coefficients are significant at the 10% level, coefficients in bold are significant
at the 5% level, and coefficients underlined and in bold are significant at the 1% level.

67. Coefficients reported here are the changes in the probability resulting from discrete
changes in the indicator variables from 0 to 1.
68. Coefficients reported here are the changes in the probability resulting from discrete
changes in the indicator variables from 0 to 1.
69. Other variables in the controlled regression are passenger sex, age, and dress indicators;
driver age, experience, and survey experience; repeat-passenger, acquaintance, night, late-night,
snow/rain, and luggage indicators; and continuous pickup-location, categorical pickup-location,
and pickup-location-specific indicator variables.
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The first two columns of Table 8 report the inferences that a driver
would make about the relative size of fares and tips that different passenger
races would produce. The top panel estimates that an "irrational" statistical
discriminator (who sees only passenger race) would, for example, expect
black passengers to generate fares that were $1.79 lower than white
passengers and to leave $1.22 less in tips. 70 And both these effects are

statistically significant (p < .05). The raw fare differential turns out to be
bigger than the tipping differential (which is only 40.5% of the overall
revenue shortfall) and hence would loom large in the inferences of this type
of discriminator. Analogous results are found for Hispanic and Asian
passengers. Indeed, the irrational statistical discriminator would expect the
fares of Asian passengers to be almost $2.50 less than the
fares of white
71
passengers but would expect the tips to be only $0.79 less.

The bottom panel, however, tells a very different story. A rational
discriminator (who takes into account not only passenger race but also
nonracial factors) would come to different conclusions. Most importantly,
the rational discriminator would not infer that minority passengers would
have smaller fares. While the fare column shows some (more modest)
shortfalls in the size of the expected fares, none of these shortfalls are
statistically significant. But the tipping shortfalls remain highly statistically
significant 72 and represent a higher proportion of the overall revenue
shortfall. In short, while both rational and irrational discriminators would
infer that minority passengers are likely to tip less, irrational discriminators
would be much more concerned by revenue shortfalls caused by lower fare
amounts (which statistically disappear after controlling for observable
nonracial factors).
The fourth columni of Table 8 reports the statistical inferences that
drivers would make about the relative likelihood of being stiffed. Here, we
find that both rational and irrational discriminators would make largely the
same kind of inference: Black and Hispanic passengers are much more
likely than white passengers to leave no tip. Indeed, the likelihood that

70. As a theoretical matter, a lower fare does not necessarily mean a less profitable fare.
Because cab fares are nonlinear, starting with a fixed two-dollar amount (commonly referred to by
cab drivers as "the drop"), it might be more profitable for drivers to service a larger number of
small fares than a smaller number of large fares. But in New Haven, the likelihood of finding
numerous small fares is low, so profitability is largely monotonic with total revenue.
71. This may be due in part to geography and housing patterns in New Haven. Recall that
New Haven's suburbs are much whiter than the city. Many Asian passengers were likely Yale
University students making relatively short trips between the train station and campus. See Census
Bureau, supra note 34 (showing that the population of the City of New Haven is only 3.9%
Asian). This hypothesis is also consistent with the diminution and loss of statistical significance of
the Asian-passenger effect when, among other things, pickup location and age are controlled for,
as shown in Table 8.
72. Although not for Asian or "other minority" passengers.
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these minority passengers will stiff is in all estimates on the order of 20 to
30 percentage points higher than the likelihood that white passengers will.
Hyperrational, risk-neutral drivers would discount the importance of
these racialized stiffing inferences. They would care only about expected
total revenue and put no independent weight on whether part of the
expectation concerned stiffing fares. But a slightly more behavioral
approach suggests that the stiffing disparity might powerfully complement
the overall estimates of revenue shortfalls. Incidents of stiffing are likely to
be particularly vivid and salient to drivers. Moreover, stiffing might
produce an independent reflex of indignation ("Why should I pick up this
person, who's so much more likely to insult me by stiffing me?"). These
estimated tipping shortfalls and the indignation effects are the strongest
evidence that revenue-based statistical discrimination may play a part in the
observed reluctance of drivers to service minority passengers.
Finally, Table 8 estimates the likelihood that different passenger types
will ask to be driven to distant suburbs. The idea here was to assess the
inference that a cab driver would likely make about the possible cost of
having to deadhead back without a return fare. In an independent analysis,
we did find that white passengers asked to go to drop-off neighborhoods
that were slightly more likely to have a dispatch pickup request than the
drop-off neighborhoods of the average black or Hispanic passenger.7 3 But
these drop-off disparities are not good measures of the true deadhead cost
because most New Haven drop-off neighborhoods are so close to highdispatch areas.
Accordingly, Table 8 focuses instead on a dimension where the
deadhead cost was more substantial. Roughly 1% of our pickup dispatches
were to the more distant suburbs. A cabdriver dropping off in these suburbs
thus had virtually no chance of picking up a return fare for the long ride
back to New Haven. On this dimension, we found that either a rational or
an irrational discriminator would infer that blacks were statistically less
likely to be dropped off in the far suburbs. So, at least on this dimension,
black passengers should be favored (in comparison with white passengers)
for having a lower expected deadhead cost on the return trip. But on
balance, deadhead inferences are likely to be second-order effects. White
passengers are only about 5 percentage points more likely to ask to go to

73. The average white passenger asked to be dropped off in neighborhoods that generated
15.2% of the pickup dispatch requests, while the average African-American and Hispanic
passenger asked to be dropped off in neighborhoods that generated only 11.1% and 9.1% of the
pickup dispatch requests, respectively.
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difference
distant suburbs. We doubt that this small percentage-point
74
revenue.
expected
in
difference
substantial
translates into a
In the end, these estimates of racial inferences suggest that a previously
unreported form of statistical discrimination may be driving some of the
well-documented reluctance of cab drivers to serve minority passengers.
Instead of cost-based inferences about the probability of crime, driver
discrimination may in part be actuated by revenue-based inferences about
the tips that will likely be earned.
TABLE 9. ESTIMATING PERCENTAGE SHORTFALL IN TiPs, AND
SHORTFALL AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REVENUE (RELATIVE TO WHITE
PASSENGERS), INFERABLE BY "RATIONAL DISCRIMINATORS"

Passenger rc

Inferred percentage sbortfali
T,ip

%of total revenue

-56.50oo

-8.60%

Paseger -ispani

-42.70°/

-6.40%

Passenger Asian

-26.10%

-3.90%

Passengrother

-52.00%

-7.80%

Passe-g

black

Table 9 shows that rational discriminators would expect that blackpassenger tips will be 56.5% less than white-passenger tips 75 and that this
tipping shortfall causes the overall revenue from a black passenger to be
8.6% less than that from a white passenger.76 Analogous calculations
suggest that rational discriminators would expect Hispanics to tip 42.7%
less than whites, which represents a 6.4% shortfall in revenue.
Moreover, the size of the inferences that rational and irrational drivers
would make about shortfalls in minority tipping are an order of magnitude
larger than the inference that rational drivers might make about the
heightened crime risk of serving black passengers. MetroCab informed us
that there had not been more than five robberies of its drivers in the New

74. One way to get a crude handle on this magnitude is to estimate the effect of assuming that
a far-suburb fare on average forced a driver to sacrifice an average-sized fare and tip. Five percent
of the average fare represents only $0.52, and this amount is almost surely inflated because it does
not take into account the increased revenue to the cab driver of driving the passenger to the far
suburb in the first place. On balance, drivers tend to look favorably on far-suburb trips.
75. The rational-discriminator tipping shortfall of $0.95 divided by the predicted whitepassenger tip (evaluated at the means of the non-passenger-race variables) of $1.68 equals 56.5%.
76. The rational-discriminator tipping shortfall of $0.95 divided by the predicted white-

passenger amount paid (evaluated at the means of the non-passenger-race variables) of $11.09
equals 8.6%.
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Haven area in any of the years leading up to our data collection. 7 There are
approximately 3000 fares in New Haven each day-suggesting that there is
one robbery for every 219,000 fares. Even if we assume that all robberies
are committed by minorities, the inferred additional cost of serving
minority passengers would only be 3.8 cents per fare. 78 Of course, for
irrational or particularly risk-averse drivers, inferences about the additional
crime costs of serving minorities might loom particularly large. But the
difference between the magnitudes of a rational discriminator's inferences
about tipping shortfalls and about heightened crime costs is striking.
This, then, is our core evidence that perceived minority-tipping
disparities may be a cause of driver discrimination. Our data do not allow
us to test whether drivers in fact make these kinds of inferences or whether
such inferences translate into discriminatory behavior by cab drivers against
minority passengers. But inferred disparities of this magnitude might be
responsible for at least part of driver discrimination. A movement toward
mandated tipping (or service compris) regulation, by reducing this
perceived racial disparity in tipping, might accordingly reduce the amount
of revenue-based driver discrimination.
The statistical discrimination based on perceived racial tipping
differences may not be limited to the taxi industry. Indeed, Lynn's analysis
of restaurants raises the possibility that statistical discrimination may be a
contributing cause of some of the most publicized incidents of public
accommodation discrimination in recent years. The class action lawsuits
alleging racial discrimination against the African-American customers of
Denny's and Cracker Barrel restaurants might be mitigated by simply
moving to a service compris system.79

77. Telephone Interview with James Cox, Central Dispatch Manager, MetroCab (Feb. 21,
2003). Subsequent to our study, however, a MetroCab driver in New Haven was killed in a
robbery.
78. The probability of a robbery (0.0000046) multiplied by a standard measure of robbery
costs ($8416) yields an expected cost of $0.038 per fare (in 1997 dollars). See Ian Ayres & John J.
Donohue III, Shooting Down the "More Guns, Less Crime" Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193,
1281 n. 108 (2003) (listing estimates for the dollar impact of crime). If we make the even more
conservative assumption that all the crimes are also aggravated assaults, the additional cost of
serving minority passengers increases to 11.5 cents per fare. See id. But the MetroCab official
emphasized that the most serious crime committed against cab drivers in New Haven in the years
leading up to this study was theft only-so inferring the additional costs of aggravated assault
seems unwarranted in assessing the inferences of a rational discriminator. The subsequent murder
of a cab driver in New Haven, see supra note 77, changes the result, but by less than one might
think. Multiplying the probability of such a crime by a standard estimate of murder costs
($3,092,804) yields an expected cost of 31.4 cents per fare. See Ayres & Donohue, supra, at 1281
n.108. Of course, drivers may also look outside New Haven in assessing the risk of harm. A single
highly publicized murder, for example, could have national repercussions on risk-averse drivers.
79. See LYNN, supra note 62, at 1-8.
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V. ALTERNATIVE (NONRACIAL) HYPOTHESES

Although the preceding regressions control for a host of nonracial
variables, there are still many aspects of the transaction that we do not
observe and hence cannot include in the analysis. As is often the case, the
omission of right-hand-side control variables creates a possibility that the
racial effects reported above may in fact be caused by nonracial factors for
which we did not control. This Part outlines the major alternative
hypotheses and assesses with the best data available the extent to which
they qualify our two racial results.
But before proceeding to consider the particular omitted variables that
may be driving the minority-driver and minority-passenger effects, we first
take on more global concerns about the quality of the data reported by the
cab drivers.
A. CensoredData?
It is important to remember that all the results reported above are based
on surveys filled out by individual cab drivers. Misreported or censored
data would substantially reduce our confidence in the results.
A weak indication of survey reliability can be found in the
nonsignificance of the Survey Experience variable reported in both the
Table 13 and 15 regressions. The coefficients on this variable are both very
small and not statistically significant. This indicates that drivers' reported
tips did not vary as they filled out more surveys. If the drivers were
misreporting fares, they at least seem to have been consistently
misreporting them over time.
The rejection of individual-driver random effects (as evinced by
rejecting the hypothesis that the random effects variance was different from
0) also provides some small measure of assurance that drivers were
accurately reporting fares. The random effects regressions suggest that
drivers of the same race were treated similarly: If white drivers were
misreporting fare data, they seem to have been doing it consistently as a
group.80 The possibility that drivers explicitly colluded to misreport is
unlikely for the simple reason that the drivers in the survey did not have

80. In sharp contrast, in an earlier pilot study conducted by Suzanne Perry, one of the
participating drivers' surveys had markedly different (and implausible) answers. This driver
reported that virtually all of his passengers failed to tip. Our impression from interacting with the
participating drivers was that each took the study seriously. Most asked questions about the study,
and several expressed interest in obtaining a copy of the results. One driver returned a subset of
his fifty surveys, apologizing that he could not complete the set because he was going to be unable
to make the lease payment on his cab that month.
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good information on the universe of drivers participating in the study. Nor
did the drivers have any obvious motive to act collectively in such a
manner.
Beyond misreporting of the data, there is also the possibility that
drivers reported only a nonrandom sample of their total universe of fares. If
drivers "censored" the transactions that they reported, we would be less
sure whether our results would be robust to analysis of a broader (less
censored) sample.
Unfortunately, although drivers were instructed to collect data for their
"next fifty rides," there is evidence of driver censoring. To begin, we find
that there are a disproportionate number of integer fares reported in the
data. Fares (not including tip) are regulated in New Haven to come in
twenty-five-cent increments. A full 44.4% of our observations were
reported to have final meters equal to integer amounts (e.g., $6.00).81 The
length of trips, however, may not be random-so there are some benign
reasons to explain why the trailing digits of the final meter would not be
random. Nevertheless, the disproportionate number of integer fares-far
exceeding 25% of the data-strikes us as some evidence of censoring (or at
least rounding).
But even more directly, some of the drivers reported relatively few
fares per day. Indeed, we find that almost half (51 out of 105) of the driverday observations included fewer than ten fares. This suggests that at least
some of the time our drivers were not reporting the universe of fares
encountered on a particular shift. On the other hand, in the process of
arranging the distribution and collection of the survey forms it became clear
that the drivers worked irregular hours. Working multiple shifts in a single
day-centered on, say, morning and evening rush hours-would not be a
surprising way for a driver to structure his day.82
This evidence of censoring qualifies the reliability of the foregoing
results. It is possible, for example, that drivers were more likely to record

81. Of the fares, 19.0% were 25 cents over the dollar, 20.8% were 50 cents over the dollar,
and only 15.9% were 75 cents over the dollar.
82. More direct evidence of this censoring can be found in our failed attempts to audit the
reporting of the drivers participating in our sample. We sent a handful of student testers to take
cab rides during the period our drivers were filling out forms. It proved to be logistically difficult
to put one of the auditors into the cab of a participating driver. We ultimately were able to match
testers to drivers for only ten fares. See infra notes 89 and 103 and accompanying text (discussing
other aspects of the testing data). We had hoped to check whether the drivers' surveys matched
with the testers' reports (same fare, same tip, etc.). But none of the ten testers' fares were reported
by drivers in their survey data. Again, this strongly suggests that drivers were not reporting the
full universe of fare data during the period in which they were participating in the project.
However, a likely cause of censoring would seem to be insufficient time between rides for a driver
to fill out the survey. Our testing regime, in which the second of two paired testers caught the
same cab immediately after the first tester exited it, may have contributed to this problem.
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the results of outlier fares that made more of an impression on them, or that
black drivers were more suspicious of the motives of the white male
coauthor who solicited their participation in the study and sought to conceal
the full magnitude of their tipping income out of, say, fear of being audited
by the IRS. (That every driver reported some substantial tips, however,
argues against this troubling hypothesis.) If the recorded fares are not
representative of the larger universe, then the prior results may not be
indicative of the broader tipping experience. However, as one of the first
studies of taxicab tipping practices and one of the first quantitative studies
of consumer-side discrimination, even qualified results raise important
concerns about the possibility of disparate treatment (and at a minimum
suggest the appropriateness of ffirther testing).
Putting aside for the moment these important censoring concerns, we
next turn to the possibility of omitted-variable problems with the two core
racial results.
B. Lower Tips for Minority Drivers
Our finding of customer discrimination against minority drivers was
both quite stable and robustly significant in the series of regressions in
Tables 13 and 15 of the Appendix. But it is always important to consider
whether omitted variables may be driving this disparate treatment result.
Here we pause to consider three possibilities: individual-driver effects,
disparate driver quality, and disparate customers.
Individual-DriverEffects. To begin, it is useful to assess whether what
we reported as driver-race effects might instead be caused by idiosyncratic
characteristics of the twelve individual drivers in the data. As an initial
matter, we found that our random effects models, controlling for an
increasing range of nonracial factors, rejected the presence of individualdriver effects (and after attempting to control for them nonetheless found
pronounced evidence of customer discrimination). Second, if we simply
calculate mean tipping percentages for each of four white and six black
drivers, we find that white drivers garnered three of the four highest tipping
percentages, while black drivers garnered three of the four lowest tipping
percentages.83 But it is possible in nonrandom effect specifications to
alternatively control for individual-driver effects by asking the regression to
"cluster" the data by individual driver.84 When we rerun the regressions,
clustering by individual cab drivers, we still find evidence of customer

83. One of the white drivers' average tipping percentage was particularly high (30.5%), and
one of the black drivers' average tipping percentage was particularly low (5.9%).
84. See STATACORP, STATA USER'S GUIDE: RELEASE 6, at 256-59 (1999).
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discrimination, but the results are not as statistically significant.8 5 In the
clustering regressions that parallel the first specification in Tables 13 and
15, we still find that black and "other minority" drivers receive lowerpercentage tips and are more likely
to be stiffed, but the results are only
86
marginally statistically significant.
To further explore the possibility of individual-driver effects, we also
reran the most controlled specification in Table 13 controlling for native
status of drivers for whom we had reliable information. In our data, all of
the white drivers were native born. But of the black drivers, two were born
outside the United States, two were native born, and two did not give us
reliable information as to their place of birth. We found in all regressions
that passenger discrimination was more pronounced against native-born
black drivers than nonnative black drivers. For example, in the analogue to
the most controlled specification in Table 13, tips to native black drivers
were 11 percentage points less than tips to native white drivers, while tips
to nonnative black drivers were only 5.1 percentage points less than tips to
native white drivers.8 7 This suggests that controlling for the native status of
drivers actually increases customer discrimination.
On balance, we still have some lingering concerns about individualdriver effects. But using a variety of reasonable approaches that
alternatively control for these effects, we still find what seems to be an
independent and statistically significant disparity in the tips received by
minority and nonminority drivers.
DisparateDriver Quality. The driver-race disparity might alternatively
be explained by potential differences in the quality of service that minority
and nonminority drivers provided. If minority drivers provided
systematically poorer service than white drivers, then minority drivers may
have received lower tips not because of their race but because passengers
may give lower tips for poorer service.
We do not have much information to respond to this theoretical
possibility. The speed variable and the indicator variable for whether the

85. The clustering procedure, by its nature, generates the same coefficients as reported in
Tables 13 and 15 but lets the data test whether clustering increases or decreases the level of

statistical significance.
86. The Table 13 analogue suggests that the black-driver tipping-percentage result has a p
value of only 11.9%, while the other-minority-driver result was no longer statistically significant.
The Table 15 analogue suggests that the black-driver stiffing result is only significant at the 6.9%
level, while the other-minority-driver result is only significant at the 9.5% level. Perry's smaller
pilot study, discussed supra note 80, was also unable to identify statistically significant customer
discrimination against minority drivers.
87. Although the number of drivers is small, combining this result with our findings
regarding other-race drivers (i.e., Arab and Indian) suggests the following hierarchy: White
drivers receive the largest tips, followed by nonnative blacks, then native blacks, and then, finally,
the "others."
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driver conversed with the passenger crudely control for two dimensions of
quality. Also, other studies of tipping generally have found that variation in
service quality does not explain a very large percentage of differences in the
amounts that people tip. 88 These studies at least suggest that the degree of
racial disparity observed is not likely to have been caused by differences in
quality.
We also undertook a modest amount of auditing of the drivers in our
study to see if there were gross differences in the quality of service they
provided. 89 Based on a total of only ten audit rides with participating drivers
(six rides with white drivers, four rides with black drivers), we did not find
support for the hypothesis that minority drivers provided lower-quality
service. Indeed, our testers subjectively rated the quality of service higher
for black drivers than for white drivers (with an average rating of 4.5 out of
5 for black drivers versus an average of 3.3 for white drivers). This
miniscule sample does not allow us to confidently test for quality
differences. But when combined with the authors' own experience of taking
numerous cabs in New Haven, we are fairly confident that the driver-race
effect is not well explained by racial disparities in driver quality.
Disparate Customers. Finally, we considered whether the driver-race
disparity might be caused by minority drivers serving different types of
customers than nonminority drivers. Under this hypothesis, minority drivers
would receive lower tips than white drivers not because customers
discriminate but because minority drivers tend to provide service to lowtipping customers while nonminority drivers tend to provide service to
high-tipping customers.
As discussed above, there are some structural variables that tend to
push New Haven drivers toward a more random selection of customers.
Both dispatchers and cab stands purport to operate on a queued basisallocating the next customer to the next driver in line. And when we restrict
our analysis to either dispatched or nondispatched calls (which should be
predominantly cab stand fares), we continue to find in the most controlled
specification that black drivers are tipped significantly less (9.9% for
dispatched fares and 6.9% for nondispatched fares) and that this disparity is
statistically significant at the 5% level. 90

88. Michael Lynn & Michael McCall, Gratitude and Gratuity:A Meta-Analysis of Research
on the Service-TippingRelationship, 29 J. SocIo-EcON. 203, 211 (2000) ("Although the average
relationship between tip size and service evaluations was statistically significant in this review, it
was also quite small-accounting for less than two percentage of the variability in tip

percentages.").
89. See supra note 82 (discussing the driver audits).
90. The African-American-passenger coefficients in these regressions remain large and
significant at the 5% level.
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But there are several dimensions on which nonrandom allocations of
passengers may still occur within these subsamples. Dispatchers may,
contrary to stated policy, give poorer fares to minority drivers. Drivers may
engage in different strategies as to which cab stand they wait at or whether
they queue for the next call from the dispatchers. Waiting at the airport may
expose drivers to a different mix of passengers than waiting at the train
station or at the Shubert 92Theater.9 1 And passengers may directly call a
driver to schedule service.
Table 10 shows that passenger races were not in fact randomly
distributed across driver races.
TABLE 10. DRIVER- AND PASSENGER-RACE FREQUENCY
Driver race

Drive
White

Passenger race
raceof
Asian
Hispanic
Black

White

50.7%

25.6%

13.0%

9.4%

1.3%

446

Black

44.2%

35.1%

12.5%

7.1%

1.0%

504

Other

34.3%

28.3%

17.2%

17.2%

3.0%

99

483

319

138

95

14

1049

Number of fares

Other

Number
fares

Note: Pearson test of independence: X2(8) = 25.9082; Pr = .001.

Black drivers were more likely than white drivers to have black passengers
(35.1% versus 25.6%), and white drivers were more likely than black
drivers to have white passengers (50.7% versus 44.2%). But drivers of each
race were still exposed to substantial numbers of black, Hispanic, and white
customers (which again aids in testing for the existence of customer
discrimination). 93 We found, for example, that a Pearson chi-squared test of
statistical independence rejected the hypothesis that black and white drivers
have the same passenger racial composition (p = .01). But we found no

91. Steve Salop helpfully suggested that we reanalyze the data to try to better control for
more aggregated driver strategies over the course of a shift. In this more aggregated analysis, we

would have tested whether driver-race disparities persist at the shift level when we take into
account that waiting at the airport takes longer but is expected to generate a larger fare. However,
the problem of incomplete shift data, discussed supra Section V.A, unfortunately precludes us
from analyzing shift data in a systematic way.
92. But this last possibility may still be an example of customer discrimination, if customers
systematically prefer to schedule with white drivers.
93. There was a substantially higher percentage of blacks and Asians among our passengers
(30.4% and 9.1%, respectively) than is found in the New Haven County population (11.3% and
2.3%, respectively)-and there was a substantially lower percentage of whites (46% in our sample
versus 79.4% in the general population). See Census Bureau, supra note 36.
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statistical difference in the average fare of black, white, or "other minority"
drivers.
One way to reduce the risks that the driver-race disparity might be
driven by nonrandom allocation of passengers is to see whether the result
persists in subsets of the data that have even better indicia of random
allocation. We pursued this strategy by looking at a subset of the
nondispatched fares where the pickup occurred at the New Haven train
station. These 319 observations (242 of which are preserved by the most
controlled specification) have fairly strong indicia of random assignment,
because the train station cab stand uses a strict first-in-line principle and
neither drivers nor passengers have much discretion to pass on a fare.
Restricting our attention to this subsample, we continue to find in our most
controlled specification that African-American drivers are tipped less than
white drivers (7.2%)-and this disparity is still statistically significant at
the 7% level.94
While the evidence of nonrandomized allocations makes it more
difficult to test for customer discrimination, our regressions controlled for a
host of nonracial differences and still found robust statistical evidence that
minority drivers were tipped less, even after controlling for minority
drivers' heightened chance of serving minority customers and even after
controlling for customers' nonrandom allocation of neighborhoods.
Accordingly, the disparate customer hypothesis does not, in the end, present
a strong challenge to our earlier results.
C. Lower Tips by Minority Passengers
It is superficially inviting to conclude from our earlier results that the
minority status of either the driver or the passenger causes the expected
tipping percentage to be lower. But these two racial effects stand on very
different theoretical and empirical footings. As a theoretical matter, it is
straightforward in randomized data to test whether one person's race
influenced the decisions of another person-for example, whether X refused
to sell to Y because Y was black. But it is much harder to test whether the
behavior of a decisionmaker herself was affected by the decisionmaker's
own race. And given the real limits on our knowledge about passengers'
socioeconomic status, we have instead focused in Part IV on the racial
inferences that drivers (who have similarly imperfect information) might
make.

94. The African-American-passenger coefficient also remains large (7.4%) and significant at
the 1% level.
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Nonetheless, other tipping studies suggest that even if we could control
for a host of socioeconomic variables, African-American passenger status
would likely remain associated with lower tip amounts. An independent
literature exists examining whether customer race affects tipping size,
particularly (but not exclusively) in restaurants. The least persuasive studies
merely survey service providers about their general impressions. For
example, a Houston survey of fifty-four waiters and waitresses found that
ninety-four percent of them classified African Americans as poor tippers,
whereas none of them classified whites as poor tippers.95
There are also numerous recorded racialized incidents concerning
server perceptions of African Americans as being poor tippers. 96 For
example,
On October 23, 1999, Charles Thompson and Theresa White
went out for dinner at Thai Toni Restaurant in Miami Beach,
Florida. When they got their bill, they found that a 15 percent
gratuity had been added even though no similar charges were added
to the bill of a nearby couple. Mr. Thompson asked the
restaurant['s] owner/manager for an explanation and was told:
"You black people don't tip well. 97
The Miami-Dade Board of County Commissioners reacted by passing an
ordinance forbidding discriminatory tipping practices in eating
establishments.9 8
More authoritative studies take one of two forms. Some of the studies,
like ours, have restaurant servers record information about their

95. Michael Lynn, Servers' Perceptions of Who Are Good and Poor Tippers 2 (2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
96. For example, an anonymous posting from an online discussion board expressed the
following perception:
When I worked at T.G.I[.] Fridays, I noticed that many tips from African
American parties were not based upon a percentage of the check, but were typically an
arbitrary amount and were usually in the two-to-five-dollar range. This is not to say that
all African Americans left small tips, but a significant number did.
Posting of Jim to http://www.tipping.org/discus4/messages/9/125.html (May 4, 2002 7:52 EST).
97. Michael Lynn & Clorice Thomas-Haysbert, Ethnic Differences in Tipping: Evidence,
Explanations, and Implications 3 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
98. This single episode brought down a firestorm of protest. "The NAACP organized a
protest outside the restaurant; the Greater Miami Convention and Visitors Bureau removed the
restaurant from its membership list; [and] the Florida Attorney General charged the restaurant
with violating the state's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ...." Id.; see also Ruben
Castaneda, Restaurant Sued over Tip Dispute; 15% Was Added to Lunch Billfor Black Women,

WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2000, at B3 (describing this incident in the context of a similar one in
Maryland).
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customers. 99 Other studies are based on interviews of customers as they
depart restaurants. 00 Michael Lynn and Clorice Thomas-Haysbert
conducted something akin to a meta-analysis in which they pooled the data
from five different studies of restaurant tipping in Houston. 01° The authors
found that African-American customers were expected to tip 3.59
percentage points less than white customers (p < .0001).102
While the restaurant studies are suggestive; they too may be infected by
the problem of omitted-variable bias. Next we examine two ways in which
our prior tipping regressions are incomplete and may misattribute effects to
passenger race that are not really there.
Service, Not Passenger Race. If drivers systematically offer poorer
service to minority customers, then the regressions may mistakenly suggest
that African Americans and Hispanics tend to tip less at a given level of
service. Instead, it may just be that passengers of all races tend to tip less
for poor service and that drivers disproportionately give poor service to
minority passengers. This alternative hypothesis is a concern because we
have only very weak controls for driver quality (chiefly speed and
conversation).' 0 3
There are, however, several different forms the poor service hypothesis
might take, depending on the scope of the poor treatment that might actuate
lower tips. For example, minority passengers might tip less because (1) the
current driver, (2) a prior driver, or (3) a prior retailer provided poorer
service to the minority passengers (or their families or friends). Indeed, it is
99. Michael Lynn et al., Reach Out and Touch Your Customers, 39 CORNELL HOTEL &
RESTAURANT ADMIN. Q., June 1998, at 60; Michael Lynn, Tipping: A Reward for Server Effort?
(2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
100. Michael Lynn & Jeffrey Graves, Tipping: An Incentive/Reward for Service?,
20 HOSPITALITY RES. J. 1 (1996); Connie Mok & Sebastian Hansen, A Study of FactorsAffecting
Tip Size in Restaurants,3 J. RESTAURANT & FOODSERVICE MARKETING 49 (1999).
101. Lynn & Thomas-Haysbert, supra note 97, at 13-14. The studies pooled include those
listed supra notes 99-100.
102. Lynn & Thomas-Haysbert, supra note 97, at 16-17. Perry's pilot study, discussed supra
note 80, also found statistically significant shoitfalls in the percentage tipped by African
Americans relative to whites.
103. Although we hypothesized that greater speed and having a conversation would generally
be viewed positively, too much of either would obviously ruin a ride. In fact, neither variable had
a significant impact on tipping percentage or stiffing, as shown in Tables 13 and 15 of the
Appendix.
Our limited attempt at using testers to audit the drivers themselves (which yielded only ten
observations) provides a smidgen of information related to the service issue. Our testers included
a pair of men, one white and one African American, and a pair of women, one white and one
Indian American (Asian subcontinent). The testing regime was structured so that both members of
each pair took rides with the same drivers. One item on the testers' survey was "quality of
service." We found that our minority testers actually rated the quality of service slightly higher
than white testers (3.98 on a 5-point scale for five rides by minority passengers versus 3.56 for
five rides by nonminority passengers). In addition, the testers' relative rankings of driver quality
were identical. Hence, the hypothesis that minority passengers might tip less because they receive
poorer service does not find support in this handful of observations.
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theoretically possible that minority passengers and drivers are caught in a
mutually reinforcing, unhappy equilibrium in which minority passengers
give little because they are generally exposed to poor retail treatment, while
drivers generally provide poor treatment because they expect a poor tip.
Class, Not PassengerRace. Second, as discussed above, the tendency
of nonminority passengers to tip more may be driven by socioeconomic
class differences. Possibly, rich people tip more, not white people. But our
regression does not pick up this impact because, again, we have only very
poor correlates with class (passenger dress and pickup and drop-off
locations).
There is another piece of evidence that could be construed to suggest
that poverty might be driving poor tipping. If we break down the stiffing
rates by fare type, we find that relatively few whites or blacks are willing to
stiff when the fare ends up being 75 cents over the dollar. But when the fare
ends up being 25 cents over the dollar, African Americans show a much
greater propensity (31 times greater than whites) to stiff drivers. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that poverty is disproportionately important
to African-American passengers: When more money (75 cents) is at stake,
African Americans are more willing to stiff.
TABLE 11. MEAN STIFFING BY PASSENGER RACE AND FARE TYPE

Race

Integer
fare

Race
white
disparity
ratios

$0.25
over
the
dollar

Race/
white
disparity
ratios

$0.50
over
the
dollar

Race/
white
disparity
ratios

$0.75
0verthe
dollar

Race/
white
disparity
ratios

White

22.1%

-

1.0%

-

3.6%

-

5.1%

-

Black

61.5%

2.78

32.7%

31.42

23.3%

6.42

6.9%

1.36

Hispanic

50.7%

2.29

13.6%

13.09

20.8%

5.73

6.3%

1.23

Asian

26.2%

1.18

10.7%

10.29

0.0%

0.00

11.1%

2.19

Other

50.0%

2.26

0.0%

0.00

33.3%

9.17

0.0%

0.00

Fortunately, a new study by Lynn has good controls for both income
and service. The study consists of a national telephone survey he conducted
eliciting information from approximately 900 consumers on their tipping
behavior with regard to nine different types of service providers-including
taxi drivers. 10 4 The respondents were asked not only their race, sex, and age,
but also their income (in ten ordered categories) and education (in seven
ordered categories). The survey additionally controlled for service quality

104. Michael Lynn, Black-Vhite Differences in Tipping of Various Service Providers (2003)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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in the way the tipping question was framed. For example, with regard to
cab tipping, respondents were asked, "If you received good service from [a
cab or limousine driver] would you tip them a percent of the total cost of
the service, tip them a flat amount or not give them a tip? ' 10 5 Respondents
who said they would leave a percentage or flat tip were then asked, "What
amount?"' 6 Lynn found that African-American respondents were 11%
more likely than white respondents to say that they would stiff a cab or limo
driver (p < .03). There was no significant racial difference, among those
who said they would leave a tip, in the propensity to leave a flat amount and
no significant racial difference in the amount of flat tips. But among
percentage tippers, Lynn, controlling for income, found that AfricanAmerican respondents were likely to report tipping 1.99 percentage points
less than white respondents. However, this result falls slightly short of
statistical significance (p = .14).
Lynn did not aggregate the three types of responses (stiff, percentage,
and flat) to get an overall assessment of racial disparities. But controlling
for service and income does seem generally to narrow the passenger-race
disparities in propensity to stiff and in average tipping percentage as
compared with our previous findings.1 07
History. A final explanation of lower minority tipping resuscitates the
brief history discussed in Part I. At one time, accepting tips was seen as a
symbol of the recipient's degradation. Minorities may at one time have
been unwilling to tip, 10 8 not because they were disproportionately poor or
105. Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Lynn has also conducted a survey that asks, "Thinking about tipping overall, not your
own practices, how much is it customary for people in the United States to tip waiters and
waitresses?" LYNN, supra note 62, at 1I (internal quotation marks omitted). Lynn finds marked

differences in the ways that blacks and whites respond:
[B]lacks are more likely than whites to say that:
they do not know the customary restaurant-tip amount in the United States (12.1
percent for blacks[] and 2.4 percent for whites);
the customary restaurant-tip amount is less than 15 percent of the bill (28.3
[percent] for blacks and 17.5 percent for whites); and
the customary restaurant-tip amount is a dollar amount rather than a percentage of
the bill (15.2 percent for blacks and 3.3 percent for whites).
Id. at 12. These differences remain statistically significant after controlling for the respondent's
income, sex, age, education, household size, and residence in a metropolitan area. Lynn interprets
these results as suggesting that African Americans are not familiar with the U.S. norm of tipping
15% to 20%. But an alternative interpretation is that African Americans are not familiar with the
white tipping norm and that whites are not familiar with the African-American tipping norm.
108. A recent study conducted by the Chronicle of Philanthropyshows that the tendency of
African Americans to tip less is not symptomatic of a general lack of generosity in other arenas. In
fact, this study found that African Americans give to charity a higher proportion of their
discretionary income than whites (8.6% versus 6.4%). Michael Anft & Harvy Lipman, Special
Report: How Americans Give, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, May 1, 2003, at 6, 8. The study analyzed

the 18% of the U.S. population who earn $50,000 or more and itemize tax deductions. Id. at 6.
These individuals donated about 80% of the total $122 billion donated in 1997. Id. at 7. Of people
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because they were receiving poorer treatment but because they did not want
to participate in a practice that had been so often framed as a token of their
own inferiority.' 0 9 Of course, this degradation conception of tipping may
have long passed. But both minority and nonminority consumers today may
still be affected by this now-withered perception-because
one generation
0
passes its tipping practices on to the next."
Stepping back, we are most concerned about the possibility that drivers
nonrandomly censored the data in ways that might undermine the reliability
of our primary results. This censoring effect by itself should qualify
anyone's reading of the data, and it underscores the preliminary nature of
the study. In contrast, we are less concerned with the various omittedvariable concerns discussed with regard to the driver-race and passengerrace effects. The evidence of customer discrimination against minority
drivers is relatively stable and robustly significant. The evidence that
African-American and Hispanic passengers tip less is slightly less stable
and declines in size as better controls for class (captured by pickup and
drop-off locations) are added. But even after taking out the class component
(to the extent our data permit), there seems to be an independent and
robustly significant passenger-race disparity in tipping (particularly with
respect to stiffing propensities).
VI. WHY ARE CONSUMERS DISCRIMINATING?

Statistically identifying the cause of disparate treatment is usually a
daunting task.11 ' And our survey of cab drivers seems particularly ill suited
to uncover the wellsprings of customer motivation. Nonetheless, this Part
tries to tease out of the data a few statistical intimations that are at least
suggestive of the extent to which the disparate treatment is conscious.
Our first inclination was to be skeptical that conscious discrimination
could be playing much of a role in the overall shortfall for minority drivers.
Is it really possible that many passengers would overtly tip a lower
percentage because the driver was a minority? But the racial disparity in the
with incomes of $50,000 or more, African Americans donated an average of $1204 to charity,
while whites donated only an average of $1072. This racial disparity is particularly pronounced
with regard to religious giving: African Americans donated 7.7% of their discretionary income to
churches, while whites donated only 4.8%. In contrast, among people earning more than $50,000
who itemized, whites donated 1.6% of their discretionary income to nonreligious recipients, while
African Americans donated only 0.9%. Id. at 8.
109. As reported above in Table 5, 39.2% of African-American passengers left no tip, as
compared with just 10.6% of white passengers.
110. Recall that children generally know when and how much their parents tip. See supra
notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., AYRES, supra note 1, at 54 (attempting to statistically identify the cause of
disparate treatment in new car sales).
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rates of stiffing gives one pause. Recall from Table 3 that black drivers
were 80% more likely to be stiffed than white drivers (28.3% versus
15.7%). Table 15 of the Appendix shows that this disparity was sustained as
we controlled for more variables. The disparity in the stiffing rate suggests
that stiffing is not just caused by a hard-wired set of passengers who never
tip. Rather, passengers tend to sometimes make a conscious decision to
leave no tip. This does not mean that passengers were consciously stiffing
based upon the cab driver's race, but it does suggest that conscious
decisionmaking of some kind was at work.
In contrast, there is another part of the data that resonates with the
notion of unconscious thought processes. People deciding how much to tip
often choose to either round up or round down to the dollar nearest their
preferred total (including tip). 112 If we use the average passenger-race
tipping percentages (from Table 4) to make predictions about passengers'
preferred tipping percentages, it is possible to identify those instances in
which the tip given was just sufficient to round the total payment up or
down to the nearest dollar. Table 12 divides the tipping data into instances
where passengers rounded the total amount to the integer nearest this target
amount.
TABLE 12. DISTRIBUTION OF ROUNDED AND
NONROUNDED TOTAL AMOUNTS PAID

Total roundedto nearest integer
S

Numbler of
fares

Percentage of
total number
of fares

580

54.8%

Rounded down to nearest integer

286

27.0%

Rounded up to nearest integer

294

27.8%

Rounded to another integer

176

16.6%

Nonrounded

303

28.6%

Total

1059

100.0%

We find that 54.8% of the tips in the data set were rounded by the
passenger to the dollar nearest our prediction of the passenger's preferred
tipping percentage. These rounded observations, to our minds, are prime
112. Tipping one's preferred percentage is harder to accomplish in cash transactions than in
credit card transactions (where the customer may have an easier time filling in a nonrounded total
amount). Accordingly, we would expect the rounding phenomenon to be more important with
regard to cash tips in a taxi than with regard to credit card tips in a restaurant.

Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal

20051

To Insure Prejudice

1655

candidates for unconscious discrimination. Imagine the following scenario:
Just before your cab arrives the fare clicks over to $7. Think fast. Do you
leave $8 or $9? We suspect that passengers are often called on to make a
quick decision about whether to round up or down. Even people who think
that they are hard-wired percentage tippers may find that unconscious
factors influence this rounding decision. Just as people who confront the
Implicit Association Test sorting game often can't help but treat blacks and
whites differently,113 people who confront the dichotomous rounding game
may have trouble purging the influence of race.
In fact, when we analyze the rounded observations, we find a bit of
evidence to support this form. of unconscious discrimination. Overall,
passengers were 6% more likely to round
up rather than round down with a
1 14
driver.
black
a
with
than
white driver
Finally, we tried to decompose the total black/white driver-tipping
disparity of 7.7 percentage points (from Table 2) into two component parts:
a stiffing disparity and a rounding disparity. 15 We find that 27.2% of the
overall disparity comes from the propensity to stiff minority drivers and
that 35.5% of the overall racial disparity comes from different propensities
to round when paired with a minority driver.
This decomposition suggests that both unconscious and conscious
motivations may play a role in consumer discrimination. But we should
again emphasize the weakness of these conclusions. We are pushing the
data to the limits of their competence, and while the evidence of disparities
in stiffing is quite robust and by itself explains a substantial portion of
customer discrimination, the evidence of disparities in rounding is much
more tentative and turns, among other things, on our particular method of
predicting individual customers' preferred tipping percentages.
VII. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS

Before examining two primary normative implications of our results, it
is worth pausing to note that the finding of lower tips for minority drivers
raises interesting issues about the scope of our civil rights laws. Does the
113. AYRES, supra note 1, at 419-20.
114. But somewhat surprisingly, this overall effect is driven by the behavior of minority
passengers. Minority passengers were more likely to round up when paired with a white driver
than when paired with a minority driver. But white passengers were less likely to round up with
white drivers than with black drivers. However, in an alternative form of this analysis using
regression-based predictions, other passenger races, including black passengers, were also less
likely to round up with white drivers.
115. The rounding disparity is calculated as the weighted difference of the black and white
rounded tipping-percentage averages. The stiffing disparity is calculated as the (generally)
increased probability of a black-driver stiff multiplied by the white-passenger tipping-percentage
average over nonrounded fares. (Note that stiffs are defined not to be rounded fares.)
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evidence of customer discrimination against minority drivers suggest a
violation of § 1981? Section 1981 is a broad prohibition against race
discrimination in contracting. 116 But we have not been able to find a case
challenging discrimination by buyers. Indeed, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
famously found that the goal of the 1866 Civil Rights Act was to ensure
that "a dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a
dollar in the hands of a white man."'1 17 The focus is on protecting minority
buyers, not minority sellers.
And even if the statute's broad language were read to regulate buyer
behavior, it is far from clear that a passenger's tipping decision concerns
discrimination in the terms of a contract. Even though the law has
increasingly treated tips as wages for tax purposes, 118 disparate treatment in
tipping does not concern a formal term of agreement and thus might not
impair the right of minority drivers to make and enforce contracts.'1 19
But whether or not these legal obstacles could be cleared, there are
abundant logistical problems that would preclude the use of § 1981 or any
other civil rights statute to discourage passenger discrimination. The
difficulty and cost of proving that an individual passenger tipped less
because of the driver's race would block even the most subsidized
litigation. Our findings of passenger discrimination illuminate interesting
issues of civil rights law, but they do not suggest (to our minds) a viable
new form of litigation.
That said, we believe that there are two primary normative implications
of the foregoing analysis. First, the government should be careful in its tax
laws not to add insult to injury by directly or indirectly attributing phantom
tipping income to minority drivers.120 The second and more important
implication is a tentative proposal to raise taxi fares by 15% and to require
"Tip Included" decals to be prominently displayed in all cabs. At a
minimum, this Essay has identified two new rationales for such mandatedtipping regulation.
A. Adding Insult to Injury?
There are several ways in which the disadvantages to minority drivers
(and, more generally, minority employees) resulting from consumer
Ii6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) ("All persons... shall have the same right... to make and
enforce contracts ...as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
117. 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
118. SEGRAVE, supra note 8, at 123.
119. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (limiting the § 1981 cause
of action to discrimination in making and enforcing contracts as opposed to discrimination in
performance).
120. Bruce Ackerman pointed this implication out to us.
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discrimination could be exacerbated by methods of estimating tipping
income for tax purposes. 12 ' For example, a business establishment enrolled
in the Tip Rate Determination Agreement (TRDA) is required to work with
the IRS to determine a baseline tip rate for its employees. 122 If this imputed
tipping income is based on the overall average-which is likely to be
greater than the minority average-minority employees will be taxed on
money they did not earn; put another way, minority drivers will be forced to
pay taxes at an effectively higher rate than their white counterparts.
Furthermore, "TRDA provides that if employees fail to report at or above
the determined rate, the employer will provide the names of those
employees, their social security numbers, job classification, sales, hours
worked, and amount of tips reported." 123 Hence, a minority employee
conscientiously reporting tip income could be threatened with a higher risk
of audit and job loss.
An alternative to the TRDA is the Tip Reporting Alternative
Commitment (TRAC). Although TRAC does not require the determination
of a baseline tipping rate-instead requiring methods for directly reporting
tip income-it does provide that "if the employees of an establishment
collectively underreport their tip income, tip examinations may occur but
only for those employees that underreport."' 124 Hence, in cases where the
IRS regards employees as collectively underreporting, minority drivers are
likely to bear an unfair portion of the blame and therefore again are more
likely to be audited or lose their jobs.
Presently, TRDA and TRAC are available to the food and beverage,
hairstyling, and gambling industries, so that in these businesses in particular
minority employees might be shouldering the multiplied burdens of lower
tipping income, higher tax rates, and greater possibility of audits and job
loss. According to the IRS, "Plans are underway to extend this program to
all industries where tipping is customary." 125 An immediate implication of
the results presented in this Essay is that, unless adjustments are made to
take into account lower minority-tipping incomes, programs such as TRDA
and TRAC may compound the problem of consumer discrimination.
121. It might be questioned why literal gratuities count as income at all, because they more
closely resemble gifts than contracted-for wages. Nonetheless, courts universally treat tips as part
of wages for a variety of different legal purposes. For a history of the treatment of tips as wages,
see SEGRAVE, supra note 8, at 12. See also SAMUEL ESTRICHER & JONATHAN R. NASH, THE LAW
AND ECONOMICS OF TIPPING: THE LABORER'S PERSPECTIVE (Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n Annual

Meetings, No. 54, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art54 (discussing the tax
implications of tipping).
122. IRS, PUBL'N 3144, TIPS ON Tips: A GUIDE TO TIP INCOME REPORTING FOR EMPLOYERS
IN BUSINESSES WHERE TIP INCOME IS CUSTOMARY 4 (2000).

123. Id. at 5.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 3.
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Furthermore, studies of consumer discrimination are necessary for those
industries in which TRDA and TRAC are already in use, to determine
whether minority workers do in fact earn systematically lower tipping
incomes and are therefore disadvantaged by the programs. 126
Apart from programs estimating tip income, minority drivers or
employees may be unfairly exposed to audits and penalties simply because
their reported tipping incomes may appear suspiciously low. According to
the IRS, failure to report tips can result in "a penalty equal to 50% of the
social security and Medicare taxes or railroad retirement tax [owed] on the
unreported tips' ' 127 (as well as a "negligence penalty of 20% of the

additional income tax, plus interest"128). Hence minority drivers may be
unfairly subject to additional penalties as a result of consumer
discrimination.
B. Service Compris
While our "phantom income" concern is analytically sound, we are
agnostic about its empirical importance. Driver noncompliance with tax
laws may be so rife that it is hard to tell whether minority drivers are given
less room to cheat on their reporting of income or would be subject to a
higher chance of audit on conscientiously reported income. Our second
proposal is more important, but more controversial.
The central idea is that prohibiting all tipping would likely reduce two
types of disparate racial treatment: It would directly stop passengers from
discriminating against minority drivers, and it might reduce some driver
discrimination against minority passengers. This second point will be more
fully elaborated in just a moment. But first, a word about implementation.
1. Implementation
It would be possible for the law to directly prohibit tipping. Indeed,
anti-tipping statutes of just this kind were passed at the beginning of the
twentieth century by a handful of states. 129 But enforcement of a strict
prohibition would be impossible. Who is to know if a passenger slips a
driver a few extra dollars before exiting the cab? And why would police
126. A further possible problem that might result from the imputation of tipping income is in
the withholding of wages for tax purposes. If a uniform percentage of income is withheld for all
employees on the basis of an assumed baseline tipping rate, that sum will be disproportionately
large for minority employees.
127. IRS, PUBL'N 531, REPORTING TIP INCOME 4 (2004).
128. IRS, PUBL'N 3148, TiPs ON TIPS: A GUIDE TO TIP INCOME REPORTING FOR EMPLOYEES
WHO RECEIVE Tip INCOME 4 (2000).

129. See Cook, supra note 18.
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have an incentive to investigate or prosecute such small-potatoes
infractions? Moreover, we imagine that the prohibition would incense many
passengers ("What right does the government have to say that I can't tip?")
and would incite noncompliance.
Instead, we tentatively propose that cab commissions simultaneously
increase the metered price by 15% and require cabs to prominently display
"Tip Included" decals. Enforcement of the decal requirement is much more
feasible, because decals are rather durable and because enforcers don't need
to observe the private interactions between drivers and passengers-they
just need to check off whether a decal is in place when they are already
inspecting the cab.
Regulation of this kind, known as service compris, is also likely to
motivate a much higher degree of passenger compliance. Passengers are
likely to know that the fare has been increased by 15% and will not feel an
obligation to double pay. To be sure, in many countries there has arisen a
norm of paying a small tip in addition to the service compris amount added
to one's check. 130 A similar add-on norm might also develop under our
proposed system.
But the key point here is that amounts added on are likely to be a lot
less than the 16% mean tip in our study. If the most generous passengers
add on at most 5% under a service compris regime, there simply will not be
enough room for either of the race effects uncovered above. Both (1) the
amount of customer discrimination against minority drivers and (2) the
shortfall in tipping by African-American and Hispanic passengers are likely
to decline.
2. Reducing DriverDiscrimination
The effect of service compris regulation on customer discrimination
against minority drivers would be straightforward.13 ' Anything that reduces
130. See Embassy of Fr., Tipping in France, http://www.info-france-usa.org/visitingfrance/
tipping.asp (last updated Jan. 18, 2002) (noting that in service compris establishments, "it is
customary to leave small change unless you are dissatisfied").
131. Customer race discrimination may be an important impediment to the growth of
minority-owned business. Indeed, two of us have argued that evidence of downstream
discrimination by customers provides a constitutional basis for government affirmative action. Ian
Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, When Does Private DiscriminationJustify Public Affirmative Action?,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577, 1614-15 (1998). Courts and commentators appreciate how upstream
discrimination (that is, discrimination by a minority firm's suppliers) can impede a firm's ability
to compete, but they often fail to consider how downstream discrimination by one's customers can
also create racialized barriers to entry. Jennifer Lee makes this point with respect to downstream
discrimination by black customers against black-owned firms: "[B]lack merchants often charge
higher retail prices because their suppliers charge them higher wholesale prices than they do other
business owners.... Black merchants, on the other hand, complain that black customers refuse to
patronize their own, opting instead to buy from neighboring Jewish and Korean merchants." Lee,
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customer discretion with regard to tipping should predictably reduce the
opportunity for customers to discriminate.
But reduced tipping discretion may also reduce a second type of race
discrimination-discrimination by drivers against minority customers. As
discussed in Part IV, if drivers expect to be tipped less by minority
passengers, they may refuse to pick up these customers in favor of bettertipping white customers.
Lynn has previously diagnosed the possibility that low minority tips
lead to service discrimination, arguing that "if Blacks do tip less than
Whites, then managers should try to change their Black customers' tipping
behavior and/or should closely monitor their tipped employees' treatment
of Black customers. Otherwise, their tipped employees are likely to deliver
1 32
inferior service to Black customers whom they believe are poor tippers."
More recently, Lynn has called for a multimedia advertising campaign
aimed at informing African Americans of the 15%-to-20% tipping norm
(and ridiculing people who tip less). 133 Our proposal inverts his proposed
intervention. Instead of encouraging minorities to tip more, we propose a
(much more feasible) regime to induce nonminorities to tip less. 134 We
propose to eliminate (or at least to substantially decrease) discretionary
tipping across the board.
While it might at the moment seem that the practice of tipping in
certain service industries is too embedded in American norms to be
displaced,135 it is useful to remember our earlier discussion of the strong
antipathy that many Americans had for tipping less than 100 years ago.
"The Anti-Tipping Society of America, an alliance of 100,000 traveling
salesmen, managed to have tipping abolished in seven states from 1905 to
1919 ... ,,136 As late as 1946, Life magazine concluded that "tipping was a
supra note 4, at 93 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Customer discrimination of the kind
uncovered in this Essay may therefore also be relevant to government attempts-via affirmative
action in procurement-to counteract the impact of private discrimination. See Ayres & Vars,
supra, at 1612.
132. Lynn, supra note 104, at 4.
133. LYNN, supra note 62, at 22.
134. Indeed, one of the surprising possible implications of our research is that the enhanced
restaurant tipping norm for progressive patrons-which has gradually developed over the last fifty
years, ratcheting up the expected tipping percentage for servers from 10% to 15% and then from
15% to 20 0/--may have actually had the nonprogressive effect of enhancing server discrimination
against minority customers.
135. That Americans only tip certain, apparently arbitrary, categories of service workers itself
suggests that we are not hard-wired tippers. For example, we tip the shoeshine person but not the
salesperson who helped us pick out the shoes.
136. Cook, supra note 18. Anti-tipping statutes were repealed in South Carolina in 1922,
Arkansas in 1925, Tennessee in 1925, and Mississippi in 1926. Herman Steutzer, Jr., Note,
17 CORNELL L.Q. 183, 188 n.41 (1931); cf Ex parte Farb, 174 P. 320 (Cal. 1918) (holding that an
anti-tipping statute violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the freedom of
contract provision of the California Constitution); Dunahoo v. Huber, 171 N.W. 123, 123 (Iowa
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national nuisance and as such should be eliminated." 137 At that time, fully
69.7% of the general public would have preferred that tipping be
eliminated, provided that service workers were provided with fair wages.' 38
All this is to say that a social practice that today seems an inevitable or
inherent part of our economy may not seem so inevitable if we look slightly
into the past (or to other parts of the world).
3.

CountervailingEffects

This Essay has identified two new reasons that militate in favor of
mandated-tipping regulation. But showing that service compris might
reduce two different types of disparate racial treatment does not prove that
this intervention would be on balance beneficial. In this Subsection, we
briefly consider two countervailing effects that militate against our
proposal.
First is a countervailing civil rights effect. Mandating that a tip be
included in the fare could make taxis too expensive for poor people (who
are themselves disproportionately people of color). The current tipping
norm may provide less-well-off citizens the opportunity to purchase
transportation services at an effectively discounted price if they choose not
to tip the driver. A service compris regime may reduce two forms of
disparate treatment, but it may simultaneously also create a disparate
impact on minorities. Hence, there may be a disparate impact/disparate
treatment tradeoff: African Americans may find it easier to hail a cab under
139
service compris but be less able to afford the offered ride.
Traditionally, disparate treatment violations have been seen as the more
central civil rights concern. 140 How we as a society choose to manage this
tradeoff may also turn in part on whether we view a tip as a discretionary
gift to a driver or as an earned portion of driver compensation. If the latter,
it is hard to be too concerned about retaining a system that facilitates two
1919) (holding that an anti-tipping statute violated the state privileges and immunities clause
because there was no reasonable ground for allowing employers to accept tips when employees
were prohibited from accepting tips while "engaged in the same occupation").
137. Leo P. Crespi, The Implications of Tipping in America, 11 PUB. OPINION Q. 424, 424
(1947).
138. Id. at 426.
139. Another countervailing civil rights effect is theoretically possible. Stripped of the
opportunity to discriminate against black drivers by tipping less or stiffing, passengers could
instead exercise their discriminatory preferences by refusing to accept rides from black drivers.
Unlike tipping less or stiffing, such a refusal would be costly for the passenger. Passengers
choosing to forgo the first available cab does not seem to us very likely.
140. For example, the disparate impact cause of action was only expressly added to the text
of Title VII in 1991. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000); Nicole J. DeSario, Note,
Reconceptualizing Meritocracy: The Decline of DisparateImpact DiscriminationLaw, 38 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 479, 484 (2003).
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types of disparate treatment so that a subset of passengers have the
opportunity to chisel on paying for their service. The availability of
alternative, affordable
public transportation would also seem a relevant
4
consideration.1
The second countervailing effect concerns service incentives. Requiring
"Tip Included" decals might reduce cab drivers' incentives to provide highquality service. While the service theory is certainly coherent, 142 its
empirical plausibility is less certain. Researchers have found that patrons'
perception of service accounts for less than 2% of the variability in
restaurant tipping percentages. 143 They have also discovered that tipping is
not significantly related to servers' or third parties' evaluations of the
service. 144 However, most of these studies suffer from the problem of
restricted range; the potential for a tip (or the threat of being stiffed) may
induce servers to provide essentially uniform, excellent service. Finding a
weak correlation in such circumstances says almost nothing about how
much the quality of service might decline if discretionary tipping were
eliminated.
Other countries without tipping traditions, or without traditions of
tipping nearly as significant amounts, seem to do just fine without granting
so much payment discretion.145 Indeed, the earlier discussion on the racial
antecedents of U.S. tipping norms raises the possibility that the American
practice may be more a vestigial attribute of racial subordination and less a
way of giving servers appropriate incentives.

141. Examining how normal, periodic increases in fares impact taxicab ridership could
provide some basis for estimating the potential negative effects of our proposed 15% fare hike. So
too, policymakers would be wise to consider how switches to service compris regimes have
actually worked in practice.
142. However, with regard to nonrepeat customers, there remains the question of why a
server would work harder, knowing that the one-off customer has no economic rationale to tip.
143. Lynn & McCall, supra note 88, at 211.
144. Id. at 205; see also Azar, supra note 10, at 10 ("When asked about it hypothetically,
[people] therefore indicate a large sensitivity of tips to service quality. When faced with an actual
tipping situation, however, the social pressure and the embarrassment that one feels when he tips
poorly bring people to tip for poor service more than they thought they would tip when asked

about it hypothetically.").
145. Information on international tipping norms can be found at QuinWel.com, International
Rules of Tipping, http://www.quinwell.com/vaca/tipping.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2005). See
also To-Do Travel Servs., Tipping on Travel, http://www.todotravel.com/English/tips/items/
money/t-mon3.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2005) (noting that no tip is expected in "Australia and
New Zealand (except for top restaurants), Scandinavia, Singapore, mainland China, Japan, South
Pacific islands, and in Zambian hotels").
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CONCLUSION

In this preliminary study (of just one thousand fares in a single city), we
have shown that discretionary tipping facilitated prejudice in two different
ways: (1) It allowed customers to discriminate against minority drivers, and
(2) it possibly gave cab drivers a revenue-based incentive to refuse to pick
up minority passengers. Changing to service compris regulation would
likely mute both types of discrimination, although such a change would
presumably discourage some poorer passengers from taking taxis and could
reduce the quality of taxi service provided.
Of course, it is always important to question whether the findings of a
small single-city study are representative of a larger phenomenon. To do
this, we looked at the 2000 Census Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(which includes a more detailed survey of 5% of the population). While we
found that black drivers in New Haven earn 7% less per fare than white
drivers, the reported hourly income of African-American taxi and limousine
drivers in the national data was not statistically different from white drivers.
The Census variables do not, however, distinguish between taxicab drivers
and chauffeurs or separate out tipping from total income. We also found no
evidence that African Americans substitute other jobs where consumer
discretion might be a less important determinant of their compensation. For
the nation as a whole, 18.4% of taxi drivers and chauffeurs were black. This
is about a half of a standard deviation above the mean black percentage
(15.2%) for approximately thirty comparably skilled job categories.
While there are some important qualifications to our results
(particularly with regard to censoring), 146 this Essay provides an initial test
of consumer-side discrimination. It also provides the first quantitative
estimates of rational and irrational statistical discrimination. It is our belief
that exposing the dual racial determinants of tipping suggests more
generally that consumer discretion in retail transactions may give rise to
unexpected civil rights concerns.

146. See supra Part V. Among other things, future researchers in this area would do well to
consider randomizing the selection of participating drivers, more closely monitoring the drivers to
avoid omitted data, and obtaining better controls for driver quality and passenger wealth (perhaps
by surveying passengers directly).
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APPENDIX

This Appendix corrects for the deficiencies of the bivariate analysis in
Sections III.A to III.C by offering a series of regressions testing whether the
foregoing racial effects persist in a more nuanced analysis. Table 13 reports
the result of four nested regressions that relate the tipping percentage to
passenger and driver race as well as an increasing number of nonracial
right-hand-side variables.
The first regression specification (reported in the first column) simply
regresses the tipping percentage on passenger- and driver-race indicator
variables. Because the white-driver and white-passenger variables are
omitted, the constant term (25.2%) equals the predicted tipping percentage
for a white passenger tipping a white driver. The coefficients on the
remaining variables represent the incremental difference for the specified
driver or passenger racial type. For example, the first specification suggests
that black-driver tips would be 6.7 percentage points lower than the tips
given to a white driver (and the bold and underlined
font indicates that this
147
shortfall is statistically significant at the 1% level).
The results of the first specification are consistent with the preceding
analysis. The negative coefficients on the driver variables indicate that
customers tip a lower percentage to minority drivers than to white drivers,
and the negative coefficients on the passenger variables indicate that
minority customers tip a lower percentage than white customers. For
example, the regression suggests that black passengers tip 11.7 percentage
points less than white passengers. Moreover, the regression lets us see for
the first time that both types of racial disparity are statistically significant.
But the first specification still does not control for a host of nonracial
factors that might be influencing the tipping percentage. Regression
specifications 2 through 4 add successively more right-hand-side control
variables to test whether the racial effects uncovered in the previous tables
(and in specification 1) are merely the byproduct of what econometricians
call "omitted variable" bias. Regression 2 adds twenty-six variables related
147. Because virtually all of our observations on the tipping percentage are positive, we also
ran the regressions in Table 13 using a Tobit analysis that controls for censored data. The
coefficients on minority-passenger and minority-driver variables were larger and more statistically
significant using this procedure.
To ensure that the core results were not driven by outlier tips, we also reran the most
controlled regression after imposing filters on the data that dropped observations with tipping
percentages of more than 200%, 150%, and so on (even checking the results when censoring
tipping percentages larger than 25%). The racial effects remained highly significant in every case,
and the magnitude of the effects did not vary strongly for filters preserving tipping percentages
greater than 50% of the fare.
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to nonracial demographic characteristics of passenger and driver (such as
age and gender) and to characteristics of the ride itself. Regression 3 then
adds four more variables related to the crime rate (measured by number of
911 calls per resident) found in the pickup or drop-off neighborhoods.
Finally, specification 4 adds individual
indicator controls for forty-eight
48
1
neighborhoods.
drop-off
and
pickup
Regressions 2 through 4 also employ a "random effects" estimation
method. In this context, a random effects model tries to take into account
that different drivers may have idiosyncratic propensities to be tipped a
particular percentage. Imagine, for example, that some random process
makes some people better or worse drivers (and hence more or less likely to
receive a good tip). A random effects model simultaneously estimates
(1) the size of these individual-driver random effects and (2) whether (after
controlling for the individual-driver random
effects) there are still
1 49
statistically significant driver-race effects.
The variance test reported for these regressions shows that estimated
variance of the individual-driver random effects is not statistically different
from 0. This suggests that the individual-driver effects are not dominant in
this data set. The real action in the data is between races and not
idiosyncratic differences within each race. 50
After controlling for random driver effects and a host of time, manner,
and place effects, these specifications suggest that the customer
discrimination result is quite robust. Adding additional variables to the
regression does not materially impact the size or statistical significance of
the driver-race variables. For the most complete regression (specification
4), we find that black drivers are tipped 9.1 percentage points less than
white drivers (and that this result is statistically significant at the 1% level).
This regression predicts that a black driver would be tipped 43.6% less than
a similarly situated white driver151 and that this tipping shortfall causes the
overall revenue per fare for black drivers to be 7.0% less than that of white

148. There are sixty-one neighborhood dummies, but many of these were dropped as a result
of multicollinearity. To save space, neighborhood dummy effects are not reported. We also ran
these regressions allowing Stata to choose which variables to drop. This produced essentially the
same results.
149. The Hausmann tests that are reported for these regressions cannot reject the hypothesis

that the random effects regression is appropriate (relative to a fixed effects regression).
150. For more discussion of this issue, see supra Part IV.
151. The tipping-percentage shortfall of 9.0% divided by the predicted white-driver tip
percentage (evaluated at the means of the non-driver-race variables) of 20.9% equals 43.6%.
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the economic equivalent
drivers. 5 2 This passenger discrimination imposes
1 53
of a 7% tax on the income of black cab drivers.
The finding that minorities tip systematically less, in contrast, is not as
robust to the inclusion of additional right-hand-side controls. The size of the
coefficients becomes smaller as additional controls are added, and the
Hispanic disparity becomes less statistically significant. For the most
complete regression (specification 4), the size of the black-passenger effect
is diminished to a 9-percentage-point shortfall (from an 11.7-percentagepoint one in specification 1).
That is still a substantial disparity, but there is a potentially serious
omitted-variable problem. Even our most complete specification contains
only weak independent variables regarding the socioeconomic class of the
passenger: dress and pickup and drop-off locations. With better measures of
socioeconomic status, the apparent propensity of minorities to tip less might
be a mere artifact of the likely propensity of poorer people to tip less.
The regressions also suggest that customers discriminate against older
drivers. Specification 4 shows that a driver whose age is one standard
deviation (about eight years) above the mean driver age (about forty)
should expect to receive tips that are 4.5 percentage points less than
average. This disparity is statistically significant at the 10% level (p

<.1). 1

4

With respect to norms of tipping more generally, the nonracial controls
provide a potpourri of interesting results. In contrast to driver age, we learn
that older passengers tip a systematically higher percentage. In our data, for
example, a passenger whose age was one standard deviation above the
mean passenger age was predicted in regression 4 to tip 3.4 percentage
points more.
We also learn in specification 4 that the tipping percentage is
statistically higher during inclement weather (an additional 13.6 percentage
points), for acquaintances (10 percentage points), and for lower fares (10.3
percentage points).15 5 In contrast, we found no passenger-gender effects.
152. The revenue shortfall of $0.76 divided by the predicted white-driver revenue (evaluated
at the means of the non-driver-race variables) of $10.82 equals 7.0%.
153. In simple economic models, the lower revenues available to minority drivers would tend
to cause minorities to substitute away from driving cabs so that they would not have to pay this
discrimination tax. But our conversations with both minority and nonminority drivers suggest that
the drivers are not well informed about the discrepancies in customers' willingness to tip minority
drivers. And even if minority drivers learned of their ill treatment, they may also face restricted
opportunities in finding and being compensated for other forms of employment.
154. It is important to note that the model also includes a variable for weeks of driver
experience, which yielded a positive but not statistically significant coefficient. Thus, the results
suggest that although there may be a slight advantage to experience (all else being equal), the
more significant effect is that older drivers at a given experience level receive lower tips.
155. The regression suggests that the tipping percentage increases with amount due squared.
But we found that the squared term only began to dominate the linear term for fare amounts due
that were out of sample (approximately $186).
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Men and women seem to tip roughly the same percentage in all of our
specifications.
TABLE

13. REGRESSIONS WITH

TIPPING PERCENTAGE AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE
1

2

3

4-M

0.252.

0.379

0.289

0.410

Driver black

-0.067

-0.095

-0.092

-0.091

Constant'

J

Racial effects:

Driver other

-0.067

-0.166

-0.158

-0.134

Passenger black

-0.117

-0.093

-0.090

-0.090

Passenger Hispanic

-0.093

-0.061

-0.065

-0.042

Passenger Asian

-0.053

-0.044

-0.048

-0.047

Passenger other

-0.107

-0.058

-0.051

-0.022

Standard
Mean

deviad

-0.004

-0.004

-0.01

Passenger age

32.77

13.45

0.041

0.042

0.034

Driver age

39.79

7.95

-0.035

-0.04

-0.045

Below-average dress

-0.034

-0.035

-0.020

Above-average dress

0.032

0.033

0.036

Other variables:'

58

deviation

Passenger female

Weeks driving cab
Survey experience'

0

0

0.001

59

-0.015

-0.009

-0.016
0.019

Conversation (1 = yes)

0.029

0.023

Repeat passenger (I = yes)

0.039

0.047

0.052

Acquaintance (I = yes)

0.110
0.038

0.112
0.037

0.100
0.045

Multiple passengers

(i

=

yes)0.3

0.3

004

156. Neighborhood dummies were included in this regression-the coefficients are not
reported.
157. The omitted categories for the indicator variables are Driver White, Passenger White,
Average Dress, Pickup Neighborhood with Average 911 Calls, and Drop-offNeighborhood with
Average 911 Calls. To avoid losing observations and to keep the omitted category pure, indicator
variables equal to 1 for missing data were also included but are not reported.
158. For continuous variables, the effects of a one-standard-deviation change are reported.
159. Survey Experience is defined on a scale of 1 to 3, depending on whether the driver was
filling out his first, second, or third set of surveys.
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ihadpickup

0.010

0.017

0.000

9.26

11.51

-0.108

-0.105

-0.103

218.03

1123.09

0.062

0.062

0.054

Fare $0.25

0.037

0.036

0.057

Fare

0.051

0.053

0.052

Fare $07

0.001

0.000

0.017

0.002

0.007

0.002

-0.026

0.023

-0.01

Amountdue
Amount due squaled

Cast) (I -yes)
Trav,1 time

9.94

11.89

Travel dista.ce

4.59

7.73

0.05

0.045

0.033

I

0.45

0.34

-0.02

-0.015

-0.007

e):

0.017

0.025

0.025

Latenightbetwee u
11 pr. and')a mn.;I
es)

0.012

0.010

-0.025

-0.012

-0.008

-0.005

0.206

0.196

0.136

p

(travel tirneltravel distance)
a

N gh .. id

Temperture
Rnvsnw(I

52.25

10.38

yes)

0.020

Luggage
Pickup neighborhood ith
0
below-averag 911 calls""
Pickup neighborhood with
abmoe-average

911

0.017

0.008

-0.012

-0.074

0.047

0.025

0.044

0.167

0.026

-0.019

calls____

Drop-offneighborhoodwith
below-a\verag 911 calls
Drp-offneighborhoodiwith
above-average 911 calls
Train pickup

-0.0 10

Train drop-off

-0.021

Number of obsen a
R
Random effects

1059

841

841

841

0.0605

0.196

0.203

0.298

yes

yes

no

yes

Hausmann test

not sig.

not sig. not sig.

Varance test

not sig.

not sig.

not sig.

Note: Underlined coefficients are significant at the 10% level, coefficients in bold are significant
at the 5% level, and coefficients underlined and in bold are significant at the 1% level.

160. 911 Calls categories are based on total year-2000 911 calls divided by neighborhood
population, with extrapolations to missing data/suburbs.
161. Observations fell out of models for two reasons: (1) incomplete driver surveys and (2) a
midstudy change in survey design replacing type of building with neighborhood for the pickup
and drop-off information.
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A variant of the foregoing regression specifications can also be used to
test whether our earlier finding-that minority passengers seem to
participate in the discrimination against minority cab drivers-is
statistically significant and robust to inclusion of other right-hand-side
controls. The previous regressions do not allow for such a test because the
passenger- and driver-race effects were forced by the specification to enter
independently. But it is possible in a less constrained specification to have
the regressions estimate effects for all fifteen of the possible driverrace/passenger-race permutations. By including these interaction effects it
becomes possible to test, for example, whether black passengers tend to tip
black drivers statistically less than white drivers.
Table 14 reports the tipping-percentage shortfalls for minority drivers
(relative to white drivers) from particular passenger races in regression
specifications that are otherwise identical to specifications 1 through 4 in
Table 13. For example, we see in specification 2 that white passengers tip
black drivers 10.4 percentage points less than white drivers. The blackdriver shortfall is large and statistically significant in all of the
specifications.
Again, there is some evidence that minorities discriminate against black
drivers, but the differences are less significant than in the case of white
passengers. The reported black-passenger/black-driver disparities are all
negative, indicating an estimated shortfall for black drivers. For the most
controlled specification, however, the black-driver shortfalls are only
significant at the 10% level. Many of the other driver-race/passenger-race
permutations were statistically not different from either 0 or the analogous
white-passenger coefficient. However, we may be simply running into a
small-numbers (or what econometricians sometimes call a "degrees of
freedom") problem. When you ask a regression to estimate fifteen separate
driver-race/passenger-race effects as well as nearly 100 other right-hand
control variable effects, it can become increasingly difficult to identify
statistically significant effects.
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TABLE 14. TESTS OF CONSUMER/PASSENGER DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
DIFFERENT DRIVER RACE, BY PASSENGER RACE

-0.101

Black

-0.088

-0.104

Other

-0.135

-0.212

-0.208

-0.166

Black

-0.036

-0.079

-0.075

-0.064

Other

0.021

-0.104

-0.095

-0.071

Black

-0.104

-0.092

-0.093

-0.112

Other

-0.062

-0.161

-0.152

-0.149

Black

0.020

-0.062

-0.065

-0.055

Other

-0.038

-0.186

-0.176

-0.158

Black

-0.038

-0.037

-0.049

-0.094

Other

-0.130

-0.058

-0.078

-0.070

Note: Underlined coefficients are significant at the 10% level, coefficients in bold are significant
at the 5% level, and coefficients underlined and in bold are significant at the 1% level.

This evidence that black passengers discriminate against black drivers
may at first seem to contradict the "for us, by us" spirit that is often
promoted in communities of color. 163 But as a conceptual matter, while
FUBU preferences will lead to a greater tendency toward same-race
contracting, they do not clearly suggest whether a FUBU price would be
higher or lower. With regard to the net price, FUBUism is a two-way street
that could lead to either higher or lower black-on-black tips. After all,
service providers have been known to refuse tips from passengers of the
same nationality. 164 This dual nature may be partially reflected in a recent
survey conducted by American Demographics.165 The survey found that
African Americans were almost four times more likely than whites to say
162. These effects are based on regressions of the same form as 1, 2, 3, and 4 where the
passenger- and driver-race variables are replaced with interacted variables.
163. See supra note 4.
164. Coauthor Zakariya (who is Arab American) reports encountering retailers who offered
him lower prices because they shared the same ethnicity. On the other hand, coauthor Ayres (who
is white) reports encountering cab drivers outside the United States who refused tips because they
had differing ethnicity (i.e., because Ayres was a "guest" in their country).
165. Pamela Paul, The Tricky Topic of Tipping, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, May 2001, at 10,
10-11.
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that they would tip a minority server more than a white server for good
service (9.0% versus 2.3%). But African Americans were also almost four
times more likely to say that they would tip a minority server less (4.1%
versus 1.1%).166
To further analyze stiffing behavior, we regressed the stiffing indicator
against the same set of independent variables in the tipping-percentage
specifications. Table 15 reports the results of these regressions, now
relating the probability of stiffing to passenger and driver race and the
nested set of nonracial ight-hand-side variables.
Because stiffing is a dummy variable, we ran the analogous stiffing
regressions using probit models, so that the output in Table 15 indicates the
change in the likelihood of a stiff on the basis of a discrete 0-1 change in
the dummy variables or a one-standard-deviation change in the continuous
variables. Thus, in the first specification, the black-driver coefficient of
10.7 indicates that a black driver is about 11 percentage points more likely
to be stiffed than a white driver.
Once again, the results of all specifications are quite consistent with our
initial tabulations: Minority passengers are more likely to stiff, and minority
drivers are more likely to be stiffed. For example, in all specifications, a
black passenger is significantly more likely to stiff than a white passenger,
though with decreasing magnitude as we add more controls. In addition, we
now see that the majority of these effects are highly significant (p < .01).
Again, the consumer discrimination effects, now in terms of stiffing,
remain robust to the addition of racial and nonracial controls. Although the
second and third regressions yield black-driver effects that are significant
only at the 10% level, the magnitude of the effects remains roughly in the
area of 10 percentage points. The most controlled specification is
significant at the 1% level, indicating that black drivers are almost 10
percentage points more likely to be stiffed than white drivers (while,
according to the same specification, "other minority" drivers are almost 24
percentage points more likely to be stiffed).
As in the case of the tipping regressions, the passenger effects tend to
diminish with the addition of more controls. Comparing the first and fourth
regressions, we see that the black-passenger effects diminish by more than
11 percentage points and that the Hispanic-passenger effects diminish by
more than 15 percentage points-although the broad levels of significance
67
remain the same. 1

166. These percentages were generously provided by Michael Lynn, who obtained the full
unpublished report (and the raw data) from TNS Intersearch.
167. However, it is again important to keep in mind that none of our specifications contain
good controls for the socioeconomic class of the passenger, so effects that the stiffing regressions
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Not surprisingly, many of the nonracial controls that were significant in
the tipping-percentage regressions remain significant in the stiffing
regressions. 68 Passenger and driver age, above-average dress, and
acquaintance of driver with passenger yield largely significant effects with
the same tendencies as in the tipping regressions. 169 So, for example, in the
fourth regression, we see that a passenger one standard deviation above the
mean age is 5% less likely to stiff, while a driver one standard deviation
above the mean age is 4.4% more likely to be stiffed. Again, this suggests
that passengers may have engaged in discrimination against older cab
drivers as well.

are attributing to race may in fact be more dependent on the wealth of the passenger. This fact and
its implications for cab driver inferences are considered further supra Section V.C.
168. Note, however, that the fare dummies are all negative and highly significant. This
indicates that passengers are more likely to stiff with integer fares than with any other type,
perhaps in part because letting the driver "keep the change" is an option for noninteger fares. We
discuss this further supra text accompanying notes 103-104. Also, somewhat surprisingly to our
minds, a passenger paying cash is less likely to stiff. Some drivers may have neglected or refused
to record a noncash tip.
169. Though rain and snow are not significant disincentives to stiffing in these regressions,
the temperature effects show that passengers are about 2.3% less likely to stiff with every 10%
drop in temperature, suggesting that cold or inclement weather does have some prohibitive effect
on stiffing. Additionally, passengers are more likely to stiff at night under the cover of darkness
(4.5% more likely in the fourth regression, and significant at the 5% level).
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TABLE 15. REGRESSIONS WITH STIFFING AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE
1

2

3

4170

Driver black

0.107

0.10

0.096

0.098

Driver other

0.223

0.194

0.176

0.239

Passenger black

0.307

0.279

0.273

0.192

Passenger Hispanic

0.286

0.198

0.205

0.131

Passenger Asian

0.061

0.087

0.088

0.102

Passenger other

0.306

0.188

0.180

0.181

0.006

0.006

0.004

Racial effects:' 7 1

Mean

Other variables:

Standard
deviao
deviation

Passenger female
Passenger age

32.77

13.45

-0.032

-0.035

-0.050

Driver age

39.78

7.95

0.017

0.018

0.044

Below-average dress

0.069

0.069

0.062

Above-average dress

-0.093

-0.087

-0.065

Weeks driving cab

0.001

0.001

0.000

Survey experience'

72

0.001

-0.007

-0.005

Conversation (1 = yes)

-0.016

-0.005

0.015

Repeat passenger (1 = yes)

0.013

-0.003

-0.014

Acquaintance (1 = yes)

-0.068

-0.067

-0.035

Multiple passengers

0.013

0.013

0.008

0.017

0.006

0.01
-0.154

(1 = yes)
Dispatched pickup (1 = yes)
Amount due
Amount due squared
Fare $0.25

9.26

11.506

0.034

-0.051

218.03

1123.09

-0.134

-0.010

0.088

-0.138

-0.127

-0.104

170. Neighborhood dummies were included in this regression-the coefficients are not
reported.
171. Coefficients reported here are the changes in the probability of stiffing resulting from
infinitesimal changes in the continuous variables and discrete changes in the indicator variables
from 0 to 1. For continuous variables, the effects of a one-standard-deviation change are reported.
The omitted categories for the indicator variables are Driver White, Passenger White, Average
Dress, Pickup Neighborhood with Average 911 Calls, and Drop-offNeighborhood with Average
911 Calls. To avoid losing observations and to keep the omitted category pure, indicator variables
equal to 1 for missing data were also included but are not reported.
172. Survey Experience is defined on a scale of 1 to 3, depending on whether the driver was
filling out his first, second, or third set of surveys.
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-0.161

-0.154

-0.133

are $075

-0.185

-0.177

-0.151

(1I

-0.360

-0.395

-0.285

Fae

SO

es)

vel tim

9.94

11.89

0.029

0.058

0.110

459
.distanc

7.727

-0.084

-0.114

-0.146

0.34

0.019

0.024

0.039

0.073

006
0.066

004
0.045

-0.047

-0.034

0.008

Averagespeed (travel
0.45
timie/tra el distanice).
Nigit (between-7 pmi and0.7
7 am, I
i
and
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5 m

I yes)

0.030

0.029

0.023

yes)

-0.030

-0.021

0.028

ycs)

-0.104

-0.099

-0.077

0.500

0.890

-0.038

0.642

0.059

-0.062

-0.022

0.116

Temiperature
Rai snow (
Luggage (I

52.25

10.38

PiCkUp neighboriood it-i
*belowx-average 911 calls'".
PickuP neighborhood with
aboveaerg 911 calls
.Dropoff. eighboif.ood with
belo -average 911 call,
Drop-offineighborhood with.
abeve average 911 calls
Tram pickup

0.105

Tram drop-off

0.073

Nthroosntol'1059
Pseudo R-

0.119

837

837

837

0.313

0.332

0.416

Note: Underlined coefficients are significant at the 10% level, coefficients in bold are significant
at the 5% level, and coefficients underlined and in bold are significant at the I% level.

All in all, the regression analysis suggests that there is strong evidence
of customer discrimination against minority drivers measured by tipping
and stiffing differences that persists and is statistically significant after
controlling for a variety of nonracial factors. And there is some evidence
that black and Hispanic passengers participate in this discrimination,
although the estimates of minority-driver shortfalls in the most controlled
regression are less significant.

173. 911 Calls categories are based on total year-2000 911 calls divided by neighborhood
population, with extrapolations to missing data/suburbs.
174. Observations fell out of models for two reasons: (1) incomplete driver surveys and (2) a
midstudy change in survey design replacing type of building with neighborhood for the pickup
and drop-off information.
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